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INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: 
SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Rebecca Tsosie 
Abstract: This Article explores the use of science as a tool of public policy and examines 
how science policy impacts indigenous peoples in the areas of environmental protection, 
public health, and repatriation. Professor Tsosie draws on Miranda Fricker’s account of 
“epistemic injustice” to show how indigenous peoples have been harmed by the domestic 
legal system and the policies that guide the implementation of the law in those three arenas. 
Professor Tsosie argues that the theme of “discovery,” which is pivotal to scientific inquiry, 
has governed the violation of indigenous peoples’ human rights since the colonial era. Today, 
science policy is overtly “neutral,” but it may still be utilized to the disadvantage of 
indigenous peoples. Drawing on international human rights law, Professor Tsosie 
demonstrates how public policy could shift from treating indigenous peoples as “objects” of 
scientific discovery to working respectfully with indigenous governments as equal 
participants in the creation of public policy. By incorporating human rights standards and 
honoring indigenous self-determination, domestic public policy can more equitably respond 
to indigenous peoples’ distinctive experience. Similarly, scientists and scientific 
organizations can incorporate human rights standards into their disciplinary methods and 
professional codes of ethics as they respond to the ethical and legal implications of their 
work. 
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incorporate human rights standards into their disciplinary methods and 
professional codes of ethics and to explore the impact of their work on 
indigenous peoples. In particular, indigenous knowledge and benefit-
sharing are vital considerations for contemporary biomedical 
researchers.1 These concepts are also relevant to adaptation planning in 
an era of climate change.2 In many ways, these fields of research are at 
the cutting edge of scientific inquiry relative to human health and the 
environment, and they will continue to be of vital importance to our 
collective future. In the United States, public policy often promotes 
certain forms of scientific research, for example, by providing grant 
initiatives from government entities such as the National Institutes of 
Health or Department of Energy. However, this research often 
implicates many legal and ethical controversies, indicating that there is 
still a great deal of work to be done at the intersection of scientific ethics 
and human rights. 
 This Article discusses the use of science as a tool of public policy 
and examines how science policy impacts indigenous peoples. More 
specifically, this Article focuses on three areas of public policy in which 
science has disregarded indigenous human rights: environmental 
protection, public health, and the repatriation of ancestral human 
remains. Ignoring indigenous rights in setting policy over these three 
areas impairs tribal interests in protecting their land, identity, and 
cultural heritage. These interests are all key components of the right to 
self-determination recognized by the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples,3 which provides important standards to improve 
domestic public policy. Today, federally-recognized Native Nations 
within the United States operate as separate sovereign governments.4 
They exercise jurisdiction over their members, as well as their territory, 
including nonmembers who enter tribal lands or enter transactions with 
the tribe or its members.5 Although contemporary tribal governments 
have a growing presence in the domestic political arena, prevailing 
                                                     
1. See Rebecca Tsosie, Cultural Challenges to Biotechnology: Native American Genetic 
Resources and the Concept of Cultural Harm, 35 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 396 (2007) (discussing 
biomedical research). 
2. See Rebecca Tsosie, Climate Change, Sustainability and Globalization: Charting the Future of 
Indigenous Environmental Self-Determination, 4 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 188 (2009) 
(discussing energy development and adaptation planning).  
3. U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/295 (Oct. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Declaration]. 
4. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 
322–23 (1978). 
5. Id. at 564–66.  
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federal policies governing environmental protection, public health, and 
the repatriation of ancestral human remains, continue to impact them 
heavily. Historically, the federal government did not consider the 
interests of the tribal governments in shaping domestic policy in these 
three areas. Consequently, the application of these policies has often 
harmed Native peoples.6 
Unfortunately, standard legal theories cannot redress many of these 
harms because the existing frameworks of property, torts, and contract 
law often fail to adequately account for the indigenous peoples’ 
interests. Of course, that does not mean that the harm did not exist. 
Drawing on Miranda Fricker’s account of “epistemic injustice,” this 
Article argues that indigenous peoples have been harmed by the 
domestic legal system in their capacity as “giver[s] of knowledge” and 
in their capacity as “subject[s] of social understanding.”7 In particular, 
the theme of “discovery,” which is pivotal to scientific inquiry, has 
governed the violation of indigenous peoples’ human rights since the 
colonial era. 
This Article takes the position that science policy can promote 
effective partnerships and facilitate the realization of human rights if 
guided by appropriate ethical constructs. Too often, public policy 
discourse portrays the interests of scientists as being opposed to those of 
indigenous peoples. This is a false dichotomy. Scientific knowledge can 
be used for broad public benefit, thereby serving indigenous peoples as 
well as others. All this requires is that the relevant harms are identified 
and addressed. International human rights law presents an array of 
principles that can structure a more positive collaboration between 
scientists and Native peoples on issues of mutual concern, thereby 
leading to positive changes in domestic law and policy. 
Part I of this Article will discuss the history of science policy as it has 
impacted indigenous peoples. Part II of the Article draws upon Miranda 
Fricker’s account of epistemic injustice to illustrate the nature of 
indigenous peoples’ claims and the harms that have arisen through the 
legal system’s inability to recognize these claims. In Part III, the Article 
discusses three areas of policy development that have created conflicts 
between indigenous peoples and scientists. Finally, Part IV discusses 
several principles of international human rights law relevant to future 
policy development in these three areas and suggests how existing 
scientific and legal frameworks can be transformed to better reflect 
                                                     
6. See infra Part III.  
7. MIRANDA FRICKER, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER AND THE ETHICS OF KNOWING 7 (2007).  
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contemporary human rights norms. 
I.  NATIVE NATIONS AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF 
“DISCOVERY”: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND NINETEENTH 
CENTURY SCIENCE 
Commentators often mischaracterize the interests of Native 
Americans as being in opposition to those of scientists.8 It is more 
productive to examine how science policy reflects certain principles of 
thought and a particular research methodology. This methodology may 
be used for beneficial or harmful purposes. In some cases, conflicts 
between indigenous peoples and researchers arise because the two 
groups have disparate systems of thought. In other cases, the conflicts 
arise because the dominant society has different goals than the 
indigenous peoples do, and there is disagreement over the concepts of 
“benefit” or “harm.” As this section demonstrates, these two sets of 
conflicts have persisted in U.S. society since the nineteenth century. In 
the text below, the Article first discusses the differences between 
Western and indigenous thought as to the categories of knowledge that 
inform human experience. This provides the foundation necessary to 
understand “epistemic” forms of injustice. The Article will then discuss 
the impact of nineteenth century science policy upon indigenous 
peoples, and its continuing legacy in modern public policy discourse. 
A.  The Differences Between Western and Indigenous Thought 
Western thought, at least since the Enlightenment era, has worked to 
separate science, ethics, and religion into separate domains and to create 
distinctive principles to govern each of them.9 Ethics is generally placed 
within the discipline of philosophy.10 The analytical tradition of Western 
philosophy has developed a secular form of rationalism to test the 
normative aspects of specific policies, thereby determining whether 
certain actions—like human subject research—are beneficial or harmful 
                                                     
8. See, e.g., Editorial, Who Owns the Past?, SCI. AM., (Mar. 27, 2012), available at 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=who-owns-the-past (arguing that repatriation 
rules are too favorable to American Indian communities and jeopardize the interests of science).  
9. Professor Daniel Wildcat describes this separation as a “schizophrenic” approach to 
metaphysics, comparing the holistic frameworks of Native epistemologies. See VINE DELORIA, JR. 
& DANIEL R. WILDCAT, POWER AND PLACE: INDIAN EDUCATION IN AMERICA 47–55 (2001).  
10. See generally THOMAS A. MAPPES & DAVID DEGRAZIA, BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 1–2 (6th ed. 
2005) (discussing ethics as a philosophical discipline devoted to the study of morality).  
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to human beings.11 
The analytical tradition of Western philosophy is quite 
complementary to scientific thought, as science is devoted to generating 
hypotheses that can be confirmed or disproved, and generating a factual 
basis for what we understand as the truths of our natural world.12 These 
truths include our world’s structure, form, and mode of operation.13 
Religion once served as both the dominant force within Western 
European thought and as the basis to assess ethical action.14 However, 
today it has been segregated into the domain of “faith.”15 Consequently, 
within secular American democracy, religion is formally excluded from 
public life and relegated to the area of “personal conscience.”16 A 
principle of “toleration” pervades, rather than any robust attempt to 
marry religious and secular precepts. 
In comparison, most traditional Native societies did not separate their 
systems of thought into separate domains of “religion,” “philosophy,” 
and “science,” although their epistemologies contain all of those 
functions.17 To the contrary, many Native societies operate within a 
holistic understanding of the rules and responsibilities that govern the 
relations between people and all components of the natural world, 
whether human or non-human.18 
This functional interdependency often influences tribal governance 
structures.19 Some Native peoples were and are governed by 
                                                     
11. See id. 
12. See generally KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIC DISCOVERY (2d ed. 1968) 
(characterizing effective scientific method as disproving hypotheses through inductive processes: 
each time a prediction based upon a theory is correct, the theory survives).  
13. See Frederick Suppe, The Search for Philosophic Understanding of Scientific Theories, in 
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES 3–8 (Frederick Suppe ed., 2d ed. 1977).  
14. WILLIAM WISHART, THAT CERTAIN AND UNCHANGEABLE DIFFERENCE BETWIXT MORAL 
GOOD AND EVIL: A SERMON PREACH’D BEFORE THE SOCIETIES FOR THE REFORMATION OF 
MANNERS, AT SALTERS-HALL; ON MONDAY THE 3D OF JULY, 1732, 33–34 (1732).  
15. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemia Dodge, Ephraim Robbins & Stephen S. 
Nelson, Comm. Members, Danbury Baptist Ass’n (Jan. 1, 1802), in JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 510 
(Merril D. Peterson ed., (1984)) (“[T]he whole American people [have] declared that their 
legislature should ‘make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation between Church and State.”).  
16. Of course, religion continues to have a significant “informal” impact on public policy, as the 
recent controversy over women’s reproductive rights demonstrates. See Rachael N. Pine & Silvia A. 
Law, Envisioning a Future for Reproductive Liberty: Strategies for Making the Rights Real, 27 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 432 (1992). 
17. See generally DONALD L. FIXICO, THE AMERICAN INDIAN MIND IN A LINEAR WORLD (2003).  
18. See Sarah B. Gordon, Note, Indian Religious Freedom and Governmental Development of 
Public Lands, 94 YALE L.J. 1447, 1449 (1985).  
19. See generally DUANE CHAMPAGNE, AMERICAN INDIAN SOCIETIES: STRATEGIES AND 
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theocracies.20 Others maintain secular and religious forms of government 
that interact to regulate the group’s domestic affairs.21 Similarly, the 
group’s overall identity expresses itself both culturally and politically, 
and is closely associated with the group’s traditional lands and 
resources.22 Indigenous communities generally possess a great deal of 
“scientific” knowledge about their local environments due to the length 
of time they have lived on the lands and their subsistence-based 
traditional lifeways.23 This “traditional ecological knowledge,” however, 
is often inseparable from the ethical commands of appropriate resource 
use.24 For example, many Native peoples in the Pacific Northwest 
maintain an impressive scientific knowledge of the wild salmon runs and 
their cycle from ocean to inland waterways.25 However, they also 
consider salmon to be one of their First Foods and a sacred resource, 
describing salmon within their indigenous language as a distinct 
“people.”26 Thus, the salmon harvest may be viewed “scientifically” as a 
set of management strategies designed to promote sustainability of a 
“resource.” But, it would be equally accurate to view tribal salmon 
management as an ethical system with corresponding rights and duties 
between the human and non-human “peoples” that affects systems of 
governance. 
Indigenous identity is intergenerational.27 This means that the 
contemporary people honor duties and obligations to their ancestors and 
to the future unborn generations.28 Although these categories of human 
beings are not currently lives in being, they nonetheless have an identity 
and are deserving of respect and protection.29 The essence of these 
relationships—with land, ancestral or future generations, or other living 
beings—is sometimes described as a “spiritual” connection between the 
                                                     
CONDITIONS OF POLITICAL AND CULTURAL SURVIVAL (1985).  
20. See CAROLE E. GOLDBERG ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 383 (6th ed. 2010).  
21. See CHAMPAGNE, supra note 19, at 51 
22. Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The Role of 
Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225, 282–85 (1996). 
23. See generally GREGORY CAJETE, NATIVE SCIENCE: NATURAL LAWS OF INTERDEPENDENCE 
(1999).  
24. See Tsosie, supra note 22.  
25. JAMES A. LICHATOWICH, SALMON WITHOUT RIVERS: A HISTORY OF THE PACIFIC SALMON 
CRISIS 37 (2001). 
26. VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 90 (2d ed. 1994).  
27. See Tsosie, supra note 22, at 286–87.  
28. See id. 
29. See id. 
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indigenous peoples and the various components of the universe.30 The 
spiritual nature of these relationships represents a fundamental 
metaphysical understanding about life and the source of animation, 
which is understood as energy or movement.31 Such a concept cannot be 
neatly distilled into contemporary scientific principles associated with a 
mechanistic understanding of the universe, such as the laws of physics or 
chemistry.32 
However, these thought systems should not be conflated with a 
particular “religious view” about “God” or divine commandments. Each 
indigenous people maintains its own religious system, with a unique set 
of ceremonial and ritual practices. Yet, indigenous peoples throughout 
the world are unified by a particular understanding of the natural world, 
which the late Vine Deloria, Jr., termed a distinct “metaphysics.”33 As 
Vine Deloria noted, this understanding does not correspond to any 
existing category within Western thought.34 
These fundamental differences in epistemology must be 
acknowledged in order to truly understand the conflicts between 
scientists and indigenous peoples. In addition, as Professor Leroy Little 
Bear has observed, the concept of science itself is one that is culturally 
relative.35 What is understood as “science” depends upon the cultural 
worldview of the definer.36 Little Bear contends that “Western 
paradigmatic views of science are largely about measurement using 
Western mathematics” as a model for what constitutes “reality.”37 This 
model, of course, omits “the sacredness, the livingness, the soul of the 
world.”38 It treats these qualities, which indigenous peoples know to be 
real based on their own observations over centuries, as non-existent. 
Little Bear defines science on a more fundamental level as the 
“pursuit of knowledge,” and claims that Native peoples and Western 
peoples equally participate in this pursuit.39 However, they do so in 
                                                     
30. See id. 
31. See id. 
32. See generally DELORIA & WILDCAT, supra note 9 (discussing the differences between 
Western and indigenous metaphysics).  
33. Id. at 1–6.  
34. Id. 
35. Leroy Little Bear, Foreword to GREGORY CAJETE, NATIVE SCIENCE: NATURAL LAWS OF 
INTERDEPENDENCE, at ix (1999).  
36. Id. 
37. Id. at ix. 
38. Id. at ix–x. 
39. Id. at xi. 
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different ways and with different understandings of the universe.40 In 
this way, the effort of Western scientists to define the parameters of a 
valid “pursuit of knowledge” may negate alternative accounts that would 
reveal valuable information. Another danger is that Western scientists 
will seek an incomplete form of knowledge and perhaps unwittingly 
endanger the environment or human health. This is one problem with 
contemporary scientific innovation that seeks to mine indigenous 
“traditional knowledge” but rejects the ethical constraints that 
indigenous cultural norms place on such knowledge.41 
In sum, many conflicts between scientists and indigenous peoples 
result from fundamental differences on what “science” encompasses and 
what forms of knowledge might be used to access information for 
society’s benefit.42 A second set of conflicts arises from the use of 
science as a tool of public policy. In the public policy sense, science 
becomes a tool to effectuate a particular set of interests. As the following 
discussion demonstrates, conflicts between Western scientists and 
indigenous peoples typically arise because indigenous peoples are 
treated as the “objects” of Western scientific discovery rather than as 
equal participants in the creation of knowledge or public policy (as a 
shared endeavor). This is not the fault of science or scientists. It is 
largely the fault of a public policy discourse that uses terms such as 
“knowledge” and “benefit” as though they are neutral and fully capable 
of intercultural exchange. In fact, the terms are often used as political 
devices to advance or suppress particular interests and values. 
B.  The Impact of Nineteenth Century Science Policy upon Indigenous 
Peoples 
Although science policy has experienced normative shifts over the 
past two centuries, the practice of using science to privilege particular 
                                                     
40. Id. 
41. For example, there is an active international effort underway to gather indigenous 
environmental knowledge for use in adaptation planning. The thought is that traditional knowledge 
can be “tested” under Western scientific standards to determine whether it is “accurate,” and if it is, 
it can be incorporated into adaptation plans to deal with the problem of climate change. Panels on 
Indigenous and Local Knowledge for Adaption, at the Climate Adaptation Futures: Second 
International Climate Change Adaptation Conference (May 29, 2012). See also 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT (forthcoming 2013) (this report will 
contain a chapter on this subject). 
42. I will intentionally differentiate “information” from “knowledge.” There are many ways to 
access information. However, systems of knowledge are necessary to assemble and categorize that 
information in ways that are useful to human societies.  
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social interests continues.43 In addition, the policies of past eras continue 
to impact Native peoples.44 This claim is best understood in relation to 
the genesis of American science as a public policy tool in the nineteenth 
century. It was this era that had the most enduring impact on the rights 
of indigenous peoples in the United States. Indeed, the frameworks 
developed in the nineteenth century continue to influence contemporary 
domestic policies, sometimes in ways that policymakers do not see or 
appreciate. 
The nineteenth century was America’s enlightenment era, and the 
scientific quest for “new knowledge and understanding” was pivotal to 
the formation of a new nation, as demonstrated by the Lewis and Clark 
Expedition of 1803. The Lewis and Clark Expedition is generally 
understood as an undertaking to map the lands that the United States 
acquired through the Louisiana Purchase. However, for indigenous 
peoples, the expedition meant much more than that. The Lewis and 
Clark Expedition incorporated the Doctrine of Discovery in a literal 
sense to claim the aboriginal homelands of indigenous nations as the 
sovereign territory of the United States.45 However, in a symbolic sense, 
the Lewis and Clark Expedition used the trope of discovery to legitimize 
the acquisition of new knowledge about particular subjects, including 
indigenous peoples.46 Discovery has remained a dominant theme of 
scientific inquiry and one that is protected by the United States 
Constitution, which is the foundation for property rights in technology 
and innovation.47 Thus, for indigenous peoples, “discovery” is a theme 
that has operated continuously within American policy to impair their 
rights to land and cultural heritage.48 
The history of the Lewis and Clark Expedition proves these points. 
On January 18, 1803, President Thomas Jefferson sent a confidential 
message to Congress recommending a Western exploratory expedition to 
give the United States the information necessary to acquire these 
uncharted lands.49 At that time, other European sovereigns had claimed 
                                                     
43. See infra Part III. 
44. See infra Part III. 
45. James V. Fenelon & Mary Louise Defender-Wilson, Voyage of Domination, “Purchase” as 
Conquest, Sakakawea for Savagery: Distorted Icons from Misrepresentations of the Lewis and 
Clark Expedition, 19 WICAZO SA REV. 85, 87 (2004).  
46. See Rebecca Tsosie, Who Controls Native Cultural Heritage? Art, Artifacts, and the Right to 
Cultural Survival, in CULTURAL HERITAGE ISSUES: THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST, COLONIZATION, 
AND COMMERCE 3, 11 (James A.R. Nafziger & Ann M. Nicgorski eds., 2009). 
47. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.  
48. Tsosie, supra note 46, at 11.  
49. Confidential Message from Thomas Jefferson to Congress Recommending a Western 
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the lands through “discovery.”50 The popular mythology of the day 
posited that these remote lands were the home of wooly mastodons, 
erupting volcanoes, and “men of a savage race.”51 Jefferson’s message to 
Congress was less imaginative and much more instrumental. Jefferson 
specifically identified a need to acquire further information about the 
Indian tribes residing in these areas.52 Jefferson noted that Indian tribes 
were generally becoming very dissatisfied with the diminution of their 
territories by European settlement and were actively resisting further 
land transfers.53 Jefferson advised that federal Indian policy should 
incentivize Indians to adopt a “civilized” agricultural lifestyle, which 
required less land than hunting.54 In addition, Jefferson encouraged the 
use of trading houses, which would invoke within the Indian people a 
desire to acquire trade goods and ideally would also place them in debt.55 
Jefferson theorized that this debt would force them to enter land 
exchanges as a means of paying off their debts.56 Congress quietly 
approved Jefferson’s request on February 28, 1803, allocating the sum of 
$3000 to fund the Corps of Discovery, which would be led by 
Meriwether Lewis and William Clark.57 
A few months later, on April 30, 1803, Jefferson signed a treaty with 
France, concluding the Louisiana Purchase, which effectively doubled 
the United States’ territory.58 Rather than being a covert expedition 
through foreign territory, the Lewis and Clark Expedition was publicized 
                                                     
Exploring Expedition (Jan. 18, 1803), in RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A 
MULTIRACIAL AMERICA 184, 184 (Juan F. Perea et al. eds., 2000); see also Rebecca Tsosie, How 
the Land was Taken: The Legacy of the Lewis and Clark Expedition for Native Nations, in 
AMERICAN INDIAN NATIONS: YESTERDAY, TODAY, AND TOMORROW 247 (George Horse Capture et 
al. eds., 2007). 
50. Id. 
51. Tsosie, supra note 49, at 247. 
52. See Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of “Domestic Dependent Nations” in the 
Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-Envisioned, Reinvigorated, and Re-Empowered, 2005 
UTAH L. REV. 443, 536–38 (2005); Robert J. Miller, The Doctrine of Discovery in American Indian 
Law, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 79 (2005) (noting Jefferson granted 3000 land patents in his two years as 
governor).  
53. Jefferson, supra note 49, at 190. 
54. Id. 
55. Tsosie, supra note 49, at 247. 
56. Id. 
57. David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Jefferson and the West, 1801-1809, 39 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1441, 1462 (1998). See Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 11, §3, 2 Stat. 206.  
58. Colin Elman, Extending Offensive Realism: The Louisiana Purchase and America’s Rise to 
Regional Hegemony, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 563, 568 (2004).  
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as a survey of “American-owned land.”59 In this way, the Lewis and 
Clark Expedition epitomized the “Enlightenment” thinking that 
Jefferson espoused: “the triumph of reason, the rightness of nature, and 
the improvement of society through knowledge.”60 
Jefferson asked Lewis and Clark to find a navigable waterway from 
St. Louis to the Pacific Ocean.61 Jefferson also asked them to make 
contact with the Indians they encountered and document their habits, 
both to record examples of human beings living in a natural state and to 
ascertain the best mode of transacting business with them to further the 
interests of the United States.62 Furthermore, he instructed Lewis and 
Clark to scientifically document all the plant and animal species they 
encountered and map the landscape’s key features.63 This scientific 
expedition had a direct and enduring effect on indigenous peoples. They 
were studied as objects of scientific inquiry, much like the region’s 
plants and animals.64 Although tribal lands were annexed to the United 
States through the treaty with France,65 the Indian Nations had no right 
as nations to consent or object.66 The European Doctrine of Discovery 
only pertained to “civilized nations” that could acquire “title” to newly 
discovered lands merely by virtue of being the first to “discover” the 
lands and establish a minimal settlement upon them.67 
The Doctrine of Discovery may have originated in the international 
law authorizing European colonialism, but it was ultimately incorporated 
into domestic law.68 In the 1823 case Johnson v. M’Intosh,69 Chief 
                                                     
59. Lewis and Clark, Inside the Corps, Circa 1803, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/lewisandclark/inside/idx_cir.html (last visited July 12, 2012) [hereinafter Lewis 
and Clark, Inside the Corps]. 
60. Michael Mooney, Foreword to STEPHEN DOW BECKHAM, THE LITERATURE OF THE LEWIS 
AND CLARK EXPEDITION: A BIBLIOGRAPHY AND ESSAYS 7 (2003). 
61. Lewis and Clark, Inside the Corps, supra note 59.  
62. President Thomas Jefferson’s Instructions to Captain Meriwether Lewis (June 20, 1803), 
available at http://www.library.csi.cuny.edu/dept/history/lavender/jefflett.html (last visited Aug. 10, 
2012). 
63. Id. 
64. See id. 
65. ROBERT J. MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA, DISCOVERED AND CONQUERED: THOMAS JEFFERSON, 
LEWIS & CLARK, AND MANIFEST DESTINY 71–73 (2006).  
66. Id. at 10.  
67. The Doctrine of Discovery was applied to dispossess Native peoples of their lands in the U.S., 
Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, albeit with some key distinctions. Aboriginal people in 
Australia, for example, were not recognized as having any right to occupy their lands until the 
historic Mabo decision in 1992. Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) (1992), 175 CLR 1 (Austl.). 
68. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE 
DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990).  
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Justice John Marshall held that the United States acquired the title by 
discovery as the successor to Great Britain, and that the Indian Nations 
had only a “title of occupancy,” which could be extinguished by the 
United States through “purchase or by conquest.”70 At the material level, 
the Lewis and Clark Expedition gave the United States the information it 
needed to extinguish Native land titles and promote westward expansion 
by white settlers71—the only group entitled to U.S. citizenship at the 
time.72 
At the level of ideology, the Lewis and Clark Expedition appropriated 
Native places and identities to give birth to the United States as a 
modern nation. In the process, Native lands, cultures and political 
identities were claimed, discarded, or transformed into those of 
“America.” While the material impact of this “voyage of discovery” is 
visible in the tangible appropriation of Native lands that followed the 
Expedition, its ideological impact is more subtle. For example, as Lewis 
and Clark mapped the mountains, valleys and rivers of the region, they 
discarded the names already given to these places by Native peoples and 
substituted names of importance to them, for example, “Clark’s Fork.” 
This re-naming process constitutes a form of “cultural trespass,” in 
which indigenous understandings of place are transformed into 
American understandings. Specifically, this occurs when the Native 
stories attached to place names—including stories about the creation of 
the people, their migrations, and their experiences over time—are lost or 
                                                     
69. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).  
70. Id. at 587.  
71. See, e.g., William Nichols, Lewis and Clark Probe the Heart of Darkness, 49 AM. SCHOLAR 
94, 94, 96 (1979–1980). Professor Nichols quotes Jefferson’s instructions to Lewis and Clark to 
gather from the Indians: 
the names of the nations & their numbers; 
the extent & limits of their possessions;  
their relations with other tribes or nations;  
their language, traditions, monuments; 
their ordinary occupations in agriculture, fishing, hunting, war, arts & the implements for 
these; 
their food, clothing, & domestic accommodations; 
the diseases prevalent among them, & the remedies they use; 
moral & physical circumstances which distinguish them from the tribes we know; 
peculiarities in their laws, customs & dispositions; 
and articles of commerce they may need or furnish & to what extent. 
Id at 96. In addition, Jefferson urged Lewis and Clark “to learn what they could of ‘the state of 
morality, religion & information among them’ so that those who set out to ‘civilize & instruct them’ 
would be able to adapt their methods to the customs of the societies they proposed to change.” Id.  
72. See Indian Citizenship Act, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924).  
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subsumed within the “American” narrative of creation.73 
This “remapping” process significantly impacted Native identity.74 
The United States annexed tribal lands and renamed them as the lands of 
the United States. Native American peoples inhabiting these lands were 
involuntarily incorporated into the United States not as citizens, but as 
“wards” of the federal government.75 
This “guardian/ward” relationship is a cornerstone of federal Indian 
law. This is represented in the Cherokee cases, which, like Johnson v. 
M’Intosh, are also authored by Chief Justice John Marshall.76 The 
Cherokee cases stated that as the “guardian,” the United States had the 
power to coerce Native peoples into accepting the “arts of civilization.”77 
Thus the United States maintained the exclusive power of regulating 
trade with them.78 Because all other purchases were excluded, this power 
to regulate trade resulted in the maximum transfer of land to the United 
States. The United States carefully employed a combined policy of war 
and peace to coerce the tribes’ submission as “dependents” of the United 
States.79 The Lewis and Clark Expedition actually followed a formal 
protocol in which the “captains would explain to the tribal leaders that 
their land now belonged to the United States”80 and that President 
Jefferson was their new “great father.”81 The captains would then give 
the Indian leader a “peace medal,” with Jefferson on one side and two 
hands clasping each other on the reverse side, as well as trade goods.82 
The Corps men would then march in uniform, shooting their guns, in a 
parade of military strength and unity.83 
The journal entries made by Lewis and Clark documented the Indian 
                                                     
73. See generally KEITH H. BASSO, WISDOM SITS IN PLACES: LANDSCAPE AND LANGUAGE 
AMONG THE WESTERN APACHE (1996); RODNEY FREY, STORIES THAT MAKE THE WORLD: ORAL 
LITERATURE OF THE INDIAN PEOPLES OF THE INLAND NORTHWEST (1995).  
74. The theme of “remapping” was the subject of the recent Federal Bar Association’s annual 
Indian law conference. Mapping Indian Law and Policy, Panel at the Federal Bar Association 
Thirty-Seventh Annual Indian Law Conference (Apr. 19–20, 2012).  
75. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).  
76. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1.  
77. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557.  
78. Id. at 553, 556. 
79. See Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M’Intosh and the Expropriation of 
American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065 (2000).  
80. The Native Americans, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/lewisandclark/native (last visited July 12, 
2012). 
81. Id.  
82. Id.  
83. See id.  
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peoples’ “moral character” by listing the Native peoples’ perceived traits 
and comparing those traits with the traits of “civilized men.”84 In fact, 
Thomas Jefferson was a proponent of the view that white Europeans 
were at the apex of civilization by virtue of their moral and intellectual 
superiority.85 Jefferson posited that Indians had the natural capacity to 
adopt the habits of civilization.86 He distinguished the Indians’ ability to 
“adopt civilization” from what he saw as the more primitive African-
Americans, who were so far below the moral capacity of a white man 
that they had little hope for anything beyond the status of slaves to the 
white race.87 Lewis and Clark identified categories of good and bad 
Indians in reference to whether they had the ability to be friendly to 
whites and adopt the habits of civilization.88 This ultimately became the 
touchstone for U.S. Indian policy, which encouraged treaty cessions with 
compliant Native leaders (the “Peace Policy”) and used military 
expeditions to forcibly appropriate tribal lands from resistant Native 
leaders (the “War Policy”).89 
Although the Lewis and Clark Expedition seems quite distant in the 
United States’ collective memory, the theme of discovery is alive and 
well in contemporary science policy. Indigenous peoples have been 
uniquely harmed by this theme of discovery. Of all the groups that may 
have been disadvantaged within American society as a historical matter, 
indigenous peoples are the group that continues to be treated as 
“objects” of scientific inquiry, rather than co-creators in the categories of 
knowledge that inform scientific inquiry.90 
                                                     
84. Nichols, supra note 71, at 96.  
85. Tsosie, supra note 46, at 15. 
86. Id. 
87. See Notes of Thomas Jefferson on the State of Virginia, Query XIV (1787), in RACE AND 
RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A MULTIRACIAL AMERICA 100, supra note 49, at 100–02 
(excerpting notes written by Jefferson in 1787 offering his perception of the fundamental moral 
attributes of black slaves and Indians). Jefferson’s line of thinking was ultimately incorporated into 
the Supreme Court’s infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford case, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), which 
found that Native peoples could be “naturalized” to citizenship if they gave up their tribal relations 
and became civilized, while African-Americans lacked the fundamental capacity to ever become 
“citizens.” Id. at 403–06 (distinguishing Indians as a “free and independent people,” despite their 
“uncivilized” nature, who could be naturalized to U.S. citizenship if Congress took the requisite 
steps to do so).  
88. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 16. 
89. Donald Fixico, Federal and State Policies and American Indians, in A COMPANION TO 
AMERICAN HISTORY 379, 382–83 (Philip J. Deloria & Neal Salisbury eds., 2004).  
90. See generally Debra Harry, Indigenous Peoples and Gene Disputes, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
147 (2009) (discussing legal battle of the Havasupai Tribe for improper usage of medical data and 
Oxford University’s failure to gain informed consent of the Nuu-cha-nulth Tribe to utilize blood 
samples for research).   
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C.  Contemporary Science Policy and the Legacy of the Past 
Most modern scientists have rejected the overt scientific racism of the 
nineteenth century, which differentiated the moral and intellectual 
capacity of the different races.91 The point of the discussion above is not 
to resurrect an embarrassing history, but to show how prevailing notions 
of what is scientifically “true” become central to the development of 
specific laws and policies. For example, the scientific racial hierarchy of 
the nineteenth century validated the differential treatment of human 
beings within American society in the exercise of fundamental rights. 
Such differential treatment occurred with the right to become a citizen 
through naturalization, the right to marry, the right to enter contracts, 
and the right to hold property.92 Although the post-Civil War 
constitutional amendments banned slavery and called for African-
Americans to enjoy “equal” citizenship, state governments relied upon 
the Supreme Court’s perverted logic in Plessy v. Ferguson,93 which 
distinguished between “political” and “social” rights, to maintain the 
second-class status of African-Americans until the 1960s.94 Scientific 
studies of gender differences validated policies according women 
different standards for civil rights—such as voting rights—and 
employment.95 It took the Civil War, a set of constitutional amendments, 
and a century of legal efforts to vindicate the civil rights of African 
Americans and other minorities to equal citizenship. However, the 
political status of Indians as “wards” and their exclusion from U.S. 
constitutional citizenship (though the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act 
naturalized Indians to citizenship by virtue of federal law) has 
complicated the notion of equal citizenship for Native peoples.96 
                                                     
91. ELAZAR BARKAN, THE RETREAT OF SCIENTIFIC RACISM: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF RACE IN 
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS 2–3 (1993).  
92. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that state statutes banning 
miscegenation between the races were unconstitutional, but observing that states justified such 
statutes on a perceived need to prevent the “corruption” of the white race through interbreeding with 
“inferior” races).  
93. 163 U.S. 537 (1986) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment ensures “legal” equality 
between the races, not social equality, and upholding a Louisiana law that required separate railway 
carriages for “white and colored races”).  
94. See Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levitt, The Constitutional Ghetto, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 
627, 635–66 (1993).  
95. See, e.g., Miller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding an Oregon law that imposed a 
maximum hours limit upon women employees and finding that the physical and emotional 
differences of men and women, which were medically substantiated, justified the restriction upon 
women in their individual capacity to contract for employment).  
96. See Rebecca Tsosie, The Challenge of “Differentiated Citizenship”: Can State Constitutions 
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Significantly, several American philosophers at the turn of the century 
rejected the scientific racism of the nineteenth century as unethical and 
immoral.97 This led to a shift in scientific ethics that persisted until the 
McCarthy Era of the 1950s.98 At that time, many progressive scientists, 
including Albert Einstein, were targeted as “communists,” and had their 
careers and livelihoods placed in jeopardy.99 The impact of science as a 
tool of social justice was minimized as research funding became 
conditioned upon scientists adhering to an apparent “neutrality” of 
perspective.100 Research funding continues to play an important role in 
promoting scientific inquiry. Today, private industry often funds 
scientists to assess the environmental and health risks of products and 
industrial development. Activist organizations may also employ 
scientists to generate studies to contest these findings.101 The disparity 
between the two sets of studies often mystifies consumers and 
complicates the work of public policymakers. 
Although the active scientific racism of the nineteenth century was 
ultimately rejected as a tool of social policy, it remains an important 
dynamic for Native peoples. Few people would deny that the 1868 
Surgeon General’s Order directing U.S. military personnel to collect 
Indian crania and other body parts from deceased Indians and ship them 
to the Army Medical Museum for scientific study constituted racism.102 
However, as of 2012, that original historic injustice has now resulted in 
over 118,000 sets of Native American remains being housed in federal 
agency and museum collections under the label of “culturally 
unidentifiable” human remains.103 Many of these remains are the bodies 
of Indian people that were murdered, dismembered, and had their 
                                                     
Protect Tribal Rights?, 64 MONT. L. REV. 199 (2003).  
97. Dr. Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Lecture at Arizona State University (Jan. 20, 2012) (citing 
SHARON BEDER, GLOBAL SPIN: THE CORPORATE ASSAULT ON ENVIRONMENTALISM (1998); 
KRISTIN SHRADER-FRECHETTE, TAKING ACTION, SAVING LIVES: OUR DUTIES TO PROTECT 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH (2007)).  
98. Id.  
99. JESSICA WANG, AMERICAN SCIENCE IN AN AGE OF ANXIETY: SCIENTISTS, ANTICOMMUNISM, 
AND THE COLD WAR 125 (1999).  
100. Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 1996) (“If academic research is required to 
validate any departure from strict racial neutrality, social experimentation in the area of race will be 
impossible despite its urgency.”).  
101. Studies of the impact of nuclear power plants are a good case in point.  
102. See Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 40 (1992).  
103. WALTER ECHO-HAWK, IN THE COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR: THE 10 WORST INDIAN LAW 
CASES EVER DECIDED 258 (2010) (documenting the number of culturally unidentifiable human 
remains in the custody of federal agencies and museums as 118,833 as of 2008).  
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personal belongings plundered by U.S. servicemen on the battlefield.104 
The military shipped the human remains to Washington, D.C. in crates 
without any way to identify the names or, in many cases, even the tribal 
nations of the deceased.105 Their personal objects became the “property” 
of the very men who plundered their bodies.106 Museums collected many 
of these pieces over time through purchase and donations.107 This 
gruesome history underlies today’s Native American repatriation 
movement. The scientists who seek to study the deceased Indian 
peoples’ bones assert that such study may produce new knowledge that 
will provide a broad public benefit.108 This argument is akin to the 
arguments “craniologists” made in the nineteenth century. The 
“craniologists” argued that the measurement and dissection of human 
heads could lead to important knowledge about the fundamental capacity 
of the different races.109 
As Section III discusses, the themes of nineteenth century science 
policy continue to shape domestic environmental policy, health policy, 
and repatriation policy. The theme of discovery is more apparent in 
some areas of public policy than others, and this Article does not attempt 
to argue otherwise. The central point is that all of these areas of national 
policy are informed by science, and all of them significantly impact 
indigenous peoples. Because of this, contemporary science policy often 
manifests as “injustice” to Native peoples. Of course, the terms “justice” 
and “injustice” are used loosely, frequently serving as mere polemical 
tools in modern social discourse. Therefore, the next section of this 
Article will construct an argument about the specific nature of the 
injustice before discussing several legal controversies that illustrate the 
point. 
II.  SCIENCE AND ETHICS: THE PROBLEM OF EPISTEMIC 
INJUSTICE 
Many contemporary philosophers have invoked the principle of 
justice to examine potential unfairness in the distribution of goods, such 





108. See, e.g., Who Owns the Past?, supra note 8 (arguing that culturally unidentifiable human 
remains are the “shared patrimony of all Americans and, indeed, all peoples everywhere”).  
109. Reginald Horsman, Scientific Racism and the American Indian in the Mid-Nineteenth 
Century, 27 AM. Q. 152, 159 (1975).  
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as information or education, that are necessary to ensure the full 
realization of liberties by all citizens within civil society.110 However, it 
is not always clear what “justice” entails. Under the pervasive utilitarian 
calculus that has informed many of our policies, substantial benefits to a 
large segment of society are asserted to justify some disadvantages to a 
few. For example, in the 1970s, the American Academy of Sciences 
designated Navajo lands in the Four Corners region as a “national 
sacrifice area,” acknowledging the permanent damage and pollution 
caused by coal strip mining.111 Those lands are home to hundreds of 
Navajo residents,112 and the health impacts of the mining industry have 
been severe and ongoing.113 Is this an instance of “injustice”? 
It is not easy to reach a conclusion on the issue because tribal 
governments often depend upon the jobs and revenues that come to the 
reservation through mining operations.114 In many other parts of the 
country, the impacts of environmental degradation on particular 
communities inspired the “environmental justice” (EJ) movement.115 
The EJ movement found significant environmental impacts concentrated 
among many poor and often minority communities.116 The EJ movement 
asserted that these disadvantaged groups faced a disproportionate 
amount of the burdens that toxic industry causes, such as nearby landfills 
and air pollution, while affluent communities receive most of the 
benefits.117 One could call this a form of “racism,” but of a type far more 
subtle than its nineteenth century counterparts. For this reason, the term 
“environmental justice” seems to be preferred to that of “environmental 
racism.”118 Today, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has 
incorporated environmental justice concerns into the policies that 
determine whether a given industry may build and operate a toxic or 
                                                     
110. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? (2009).  
111. Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous Peoples and Environmental Justice: The Impact of Climate 
Change, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1625, 1630 (2007).  
112. History, NAVAJO NATION, http://www.navajo-nsn.gov/history.htm (last visited July 12, 
2012).  
113. See, e.g., Susan E. Dawson, Navajo Uranium Workers and the Effects of Occupational 
Illnesses: A Case Study, 51 HUM. ORG. 389 (1992).  
114. See Tsosie, supra note 2.  
115. Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging The Gap Between Environmental Laws And 
“Justice,” 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 225–27 (1997).  
116. See id. at 223.  
117. See KATHRYN MUTZ ET AL., JUSTICE AND NATURAL RESOURCES (2002).  
118. The federal policy uses “environmental justice,” and not “environmental racism,” indicating 
that this is the preferred term in policymaking. See Environmental Justice, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice (last visited July 12, 2012). 
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dangerous facility within a community.119 
The EPA’s response to the EJ movement represents an attempt to 
mitigate social inequities through domestic law and policy. The 
theoretical work on justice, however, is more provocative and promotes 
a more nuanced analysis of the public policy response. For example, 
John Rawls’ influential theory of justice specifically rejects the 
utilitarian calculus, asserting that “in a just society the liberties of equal 
citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not 
subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.”120 
Rawls’ account would argue in favor of a public policy that ensured an 
equal distribution of risks and benefits. However, society can only 
achieve this model of justice if it truly appreciates and understands the 
interests and rights particular social policies might impair, despite a fair 
and neutral appearance under prevailing standards. 
This section of the Article draws upon Miranda Fricker’s 
philosophical work121 to explain how “epistemic” forms of injustice—
those injustices relating to the categories of knowledge and experience 
that law and public policy sanctions—affect indigenous peoples. This 
Article will also discuss why the resulting harms caused by epistemic 
injustice are often invisible within the domestic legal and public policy 
arenas. Section II provides the foundation for Section III’s analysis of 
specific case studies. Section II first describes the problem of epistemic 
injustice and then explores two forms of epistemic injustice that 
indigenous peoples have experienced within domestic law and public 
policy. Section II then associates the key components of Fricker’s theory 
of epistemic injustice with the Rawlsian claim for equal citizenship, 
which is the predominant focus of justice theory. 
A.  Understanding Epistemic Injustice 
As demonstrated above, many of the conflicts between indigenous 
peoples and scientists revolve around fundamental differences in their 
respective systems of thought, particularly as these concern the 
categories of experience that are relevant to understanding the natural 
world. These epistemological differences, in turn, heavily influence the 
formation of public policy and can operate to cause forms of “epistemic 
injustice” for the affected groups. 
Within the United States, domestic policymaking is dependent upon a 
                                                     
119. Id.  
120. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 4 (1971).  
121. FRICKER, supra note 7. 
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model of secular pluralism.122 Secular pluralism privileges Western 
European understandings of science, economics, and technology as the 
appropriate constructs for domestic public policy.123 Although 
indigenous peoples have analogous concepts, such as traditional 
ecological knowledge,124 these understandings are routinely disregarded 
within public policy discourse.125 Policymakers and jurists tend to 
understand indigenous cultural worldviews as “religious beliefs” and 
marginalize these interests as matters of “private conscience.”126 To the 
extent that Western society excludes indigenous worldviews from 
important social interactions within domestic policy structures, 
indigenous peoples are likely to suffer epistemic forms of injustice. In 
most cases, these harms will not be seen or appreciated by others, 
meaning that the legal system will be unable to provide any redress. 
Miranda Fricker’s account of “epistemic injustice” facilitates an 
understanding of the subtle ways in which indigenous peoples have been 
excluded from full participation in shaping domestic law and public 
policy. Although Fricker’s account is potentially illuminating for all 
societies, this Article discusses its utility for understanding the effect of 
U.S. public policy upon Native peoples in this country. 
Fricker’s work examines the impacts of our basic social interactions, 
many of which center on knowledge and social experience.127 She 
maintains that there are “ethical aspects of two of our most basic 
everyday epistemic practices: conveying knowledge to others by telling 
them, and making sense of our own social experiences.”128 These 
practices, in turn, implicate the operation of social power in epistemic 
interactions, promoting an inquiry into the “politics of epistemic 
practice.”129 The politics of epistemic practice determine how social 
power—or social disadvantage—operates to produce injustice in our 
everyday epistemic practices. 
Social power, of course, is a fact of social discourse. In that sense, 
                                                     





126. I discuss this in relation to public lands management in Rebecca Tsosie, The Conflict 
Between the Public Trust and the Indian Trust Doctrines: Public Land Policy and Native Nations, 
39 TULSA L. REV. 271 (2003). 
127. FRICKER, supra note 7, at 1.  
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 2. 
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Fricker argues, we need not describe social power as “bad.”130 Instead, 
Fricker encourages us to notice when social power is being exercised 
and then ask “who or what is controlling whom, and why.”131 Moreover, 
some social interactions will hinge upon the participants’ mutual 
understanding of their social identity, which might indicate that some 
form of “identity power” is at work.132 For example, this could occur 
when a man makes some use of his male identity to influence a woman, 
perhaps by patronizing or otherwise intimidating her.133 This subtle form 
of domination requires an explicit focus, and Fricker’s theory of 
epistemic injustice provides such a lens. 
Fricker’s account of epistemic injustice has critically important 
implications. The law is a social institution that broadly invokes power 
relations between the government and its citizens and between the U.S. 
and Native Nations. In the former case, the government and its citizens 
share a sense of identity within civic society, although they may also 
depart from this shared conception in the exercise of pluralism or 
multiculturalism. In the latter case, however, the essential interaction of 
the two groups (U.S. and Native Nations) does not rest upon a shared 
conception of identity. In fact, the principle of indigenous self-
determination depends upon the ability of an indigenous people to 
express its own identity as an autonomous group and to negotiate the 
terms of its political relationship with the given nation-state. Identity-
power is perhaps the single most important dynamic of this relationship. 
Thus, one must carefully ascertain when epistemic injustice operates to 
suppress an indigenous group’s ability to define its own identity. 
According to Fricker, this can occur in the form of “testimonial” or 
“hermeneutical” injustice.134 As the following discussion demonstrates, 
testimonial injustice arises when someone is wronged in his or her 
capacity as a giver of knowledge, while hermeneutical injustice arises 
when someone is wronged in his or her capacity as a subject of social 
understanding.135 
B.  Testimonial Injustice 
Of the two forms of epistemic injustice, testimonial injustice is 
                                                     
130. Id. at 14.  
131. Id.  
132. Id. 
133. Id.  
134. Id. at 4, 7. 
135. Id. at 7. 
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perhaps more basic to legal theory and practice. After all, lawyers 
commonly invoke testimony as “proof” that something did or did not 
take place. However, it is necessary to examine why we qualify some 
persons as “capable” of giving testimony while we exclude others from 
this privilege. It is also necessary to understand that we may accord this 
privilege as a matter of institutional practice, or it may become part of 
less formal social interactions. In either case, these epistemic practices 
can impair indigenous peoples’ rights and interests. According to 
Fricker, testimonial injustice commonly arises from a dysfunction in a 
testimonial practice that is related to identity.136 For example, listeners 
may evaluate some speakers as more credible due to the speaker’s 
gender, age, class, income, accent, or appearance. Conversely, others 
will experience a “credibility deficit” due to the same factors.137 
Many of these practices exist at the level of informal social 
interaction, but others are formalized into our legal, social or political 
structures, which leads to “systemic testimonial injustice.”138 An 
accepted practice within the American legal system is to qualify a 
witness before they may give “expert testimony.”139 The implications of 
this can be significant for indigenous peoples. For example, an 
indigenous group petitioning for political recognition through the 
“federal acknowledgement process” must obtain credible testimony that 
the group is, in fact, an “Indian tribe” that merits political recognition.140 
Similarly, if an indigenous group claims that a particular sacred place 
should be protected as a “Traditional Cultural Property” (TCP) pursuant 
to the National Historic Preservation Act, it must secure expert 
testimony sufficient to prove this status.141 In either case, a successful 
outcome will likely depend upon the “expert” testimony of a trained 
academic who has studied the group and can determine whether the 
group constitutes “an Indian tribe” or whether the place constitutes a 
TCP under the particular statutory or regulatory criteria.142 
                                                     
136. Id. at 4, 14–16. 
137. Id. at 17. 
138. Id. at 28. 
139. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  
140. 25 C.F.R. § 83 (2012).  
141. See, e.g., Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, 50 F.3d 856 (10th Cir. 1995) (describing 
process for identifying traditional cultural properties under the National Historic Preservation Act).   
142. Id. at 860–61 (describing affidavits of anthropologists who documented the existence of 
TCPs). Also, the required criteria to be acknowledged as a “federally-recognized Indian tribe” are 
listed at 25 C.F.R. § 83.7. The National Historic Preservation Act is codified at 16 U.S.C. § 470 
(2006) and was amended to include “traditional cultural properties,” in addition to the more 
conventional historic buildings and monuments that were originally associated with that statute. 
 
07 - Tsosie Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2012  7:38 PM 
1156 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:1133 
 
Courts are unlikely to recognize tribal members as having the same 
credibility as an “expert witness,” although certain tribal cultural 
practitioners, including tribal historians and traditional healers, may have 
recognized cultural expertise in specific areas. Tribal language, oral 
tradition, and ceremonial practice are all areas that may contain esoteric 
knowledge beyond the comprehension of even the most experienced 
academics. The categories of knowledge that cultural practitioners hold 
are often invisible within the U.S. legal system. This is because most of 
these individuals do not possess formal academic credentials to “prove” 
that they possess relevant knowledge for purposes of giving “expert 
testimony” in legal proceedings.143 
Some might argue that we can overcome testimonial injustice by 
increasing our awareness of how the court system treats Native 
witnesses or by committing to modify our legal structures to minimize 
the unfairness that might result from differential power relations. For 
example, the legislative branches can specifically authorize Native 
cultural testimony as a form of “expert” testimony, or courts can 
interpret evidentiary rules to sustain this practice. However, even when 
the law explicitly allows such testimony, the courts must still be willing 
to consider this testimony as probative of a specific claim. For example, 
the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946 authorized tribal claimants 
to give testimony on traditional patterns of land use to sustain their 
claims against the United States for the appropriation of tribal property 
without consent of the tribe.144 Under the statute, such testimony could 
be admitted under a variety of theories in order to sustain, for example, a 
claim against the government’s taking of a group’s aboriginal title or its 
treaty-guaranteed lands.145 However, a common threshold issue might be 
whether the group merits compensation as a matter of constitutional 
right under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, or whether it is merely 
entitled to a lesser form of statutory payment designed to extinguish the 
                                                     
Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4600 (1992). 
143. See, e.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 277–78 (1955) (dismissing the 
testimony of a traditional leader about the property claim of the Tee-Hit-Ton Indians).  
144. The Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946 authorized tribes to bring five categories of 
claims against the United States to redress historic wrongs, including treaty violations and takings of 
land, so long as they did so within the statutory time period. Tsosie, supra note 49, at 256–58. The 
claims were first processed by the Indian Claims Commission, and then appeals could be taken to 
the United States Court of Claims. See id. The statute also authorized tribal claimants for the first 
time to use the Court of Claims to obtain relief for wrongs that occurred after the effective date of 
the statute, as did the taking of timber in the Tee-Hit-Ton case. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 
20, at 1022–24.  
145. Id.  
07 - Tsosie Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2012  7:38 PM 
2012] INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE 1157 
 
legal claim. Only the constitutional claim would offer parity with the 
legal treatment extended to non-Native claimants when the government 
takes their property interests.146 
In Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States,147 the tribe brought a Fifth 
Amendment takings claim against the United States in connection with 
the government’s decision to authorize timber harvesting from the 
tribe’s traditional lands in Alaska.148 The United States acquired Alaska 
through a treaty with Russia, which, unlike Great Britain, had not 
colonized its American territories, casting doubt on whether it had 
effectively settled the lands for purposes of claiming title under the 
Doctrine of Discovery.149 The Tee-Hit-Ton Indians maintained that they 
were the rightful owners of these lands and thus had a property interest 
in the timber that sustained their takings claim.150 The Supreme Court 
disagreed, noting that the testimony offered by the tribal member 
selected to be the group’s expert witness merely proved the tribe’s 
“group” claim to the area in accordance with the tribe’s “hunting and 
fishing stage of civilization.”151 The Court saw this “primitive” form of 
land use as merely establishing the group’s claim to “aboriginal title” on 
the same level as other Indians but not establishing a true “property 
interest” within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution.152 Instead, the 
Court employed the Doctrine of Discovery to find that the taking of 
“Indian title” does not require “just compensation” under the U.S. 
Constitution because: 
Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this 
continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and 
that, even when the Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in 
return for blankets, food and trinkets, it was not a sale but the 
conqueror’s will that deprived them of their land.153 
 The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the testimony provided by the 
tribal witness was based on a shared social experience of “property 
rights” informed by Western thought, and it had no resonance with the 
                                                     
146. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
147. 348 U.S. 272.  
148. Id. at 314.  
149. See generally Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 316, 320–21 (describing evidence as Russia 
not “settling” the lands in Alaska, but merely engaging in sporadic trading with the Native peoples).  
150. Id.  
151. Id. at 287.  
152. Id. at 284.  
153. Id. at 289–90.  
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experience of the Native claimants.154 In that respect, Tee-Hit-Ton raises 
Fricker’s second category of epistemic injustice, namely “hermeneutical 
injustice.” As the following discussion demonstrates, the dynamic of 
hermeneutical injustice is more subtle than testimonial injustice because 
it engages the interpretation of social experience. While this may seem 
tangential to the law, it is actually quite important for indigenous peoples 
because the law reflects the dominant society’s interpretation of relevant 
social experience. Not surprisingly, the dominant society’s interpretive 
norms routinely exclude indigenous categories of experience. 
C.  Hermeneutical Injustice 
According to Fricker, hermeneutical injustice is “the injustice of 
having some significant area of one’s social experience obscured from 
collective understanding” because the group is structurally prejudiced 
and cannot participate on an equal basis in creating a shared meaning for 
the social experience.155 Hermeneutical injustice raises difficult 
questions because prevailing relations of power can destroy or constrain 
the ability of a group to understand its own experience.156 Fricker draws 
on the work of feminist scholars to show how the concept of “sexual 
harassment” that now constitutes a claim under federal and state 
antidiscrimination laws was, for many years, not a visible category of 
social experience, let alone a legal cause of action.157 Women lacked 
equal power in the workplace, and in that sense, they were 
“hermeneutically marginalized” from creating a shared experience of 
social meaning.158 Thus, female subordinates had no way to make a 
claim for harm based on their experience of “discomfort” at being 
patted, kissed, groped, or propositioned by male superiors.159 The harm 
simply was not seen or understood by others outside this experience.160 
Hermeneutical injustice is what occurs with many Native American 
claims to protect aspects of their cultural identity from harms that are not 
recognized standard categories of law. In particular, there is currently 
not a recognized category within American law to redress cultural harm, 
                                                     
154. Id. at 284.  
155. FRICKER, supra note 7, at 7, 153–54. 
156. See id. at 7. 
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as the following cases demonstrate.161 
Following the Exxon Valdez oil spill, several Native Alaskan 
communities sued Exxon for the destruction of their traditional 
subsistence ways of life caused by the massive oil spill because the spill 
decimated the fish and wildlife upon which they depended.162 The Ninth 
Circuit declined to find a cause of action, distinguishing the tangible 
harms to natural resources, which were actionable, from the “intangible” 
harms to culture, which were not.163 The Ninth Circuit perceived culture 
as merely an “internal” state of mind, positing that “one’s culture—a 
person’s way of life—is deeply embedded in the mind and 
heart. . . . [C]atastrophic cultural impacts cannot change what is in the 
mind or in the heart unless we lose the will to pursue a given way of 
life.”164 Of course, it is unclear how a group can preserve a cultural “way 
of life” when the essential components are destroyed. 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, refused to halt a National 
Forest Service development plan authorizing a ski facility to pump 
treated sewage effluent from Flagstaff to generate artificial snow on a 
mountain held sacred by the Navajo Nation, Hopi Tribe, and several 
other tribes in the Southwest.165 The Tribes had filed their claim under 
the Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),166 which 
purports to restore the compelling interest test for any federal action that 
places a substantial burden upon religion.167 However, the court found 
that the standard under RFRA incorporates existing Supreme Court case 
law defining what constitutes a “substantial burden.”168 Consequently, 
the court drew on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lyng v. Northwest 
Indian Cemetery Protective Association,169 which held that the 
destruction of indigenous religion arising from a road construction 
                                                     
161. I have written in more detail about cultural harm in other work. See generally Tsosie, supra 
note 1.   
162. In re Exxon Valdez, 104 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 1997).  
163. Id. at 1197–98.  
164. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV (HRH), 1994 WL 182856, at *4 (D. Alaska Mar. 23, 
1994), aff’d, 104 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 1997).  
165. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). The plaintiffs 
in this case consisted of several Indian tribes throughout the Southwest as well as individual Indian 
practitioners and activist organizations. Id. at 1063. 
166. Id. at 1066. 
167. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2006); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997) (finding that RFRA is unconstitutional as applied to the actions of state governments).   
168. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1074.  
169. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).  
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project through a tribal sacred site was not actionable under the First 
Amendment because the tribes were free to “believe” as they wanted.170 
Thus the court ruled that the Native peoples had no right to condition the 
Forest Service in the management of federal public lands.171 The Ninth 
Circuit held that the standard to be applied in a RFRA case was the same 
as that in a First Amendment case and further found that the road-
building project in Lyng could not be distinguished in any meaningful 
way from the use of reclaimed wastewater on the San Francisco 
Peaks.172 Following the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in Lyng, 
the Ninth Circuit also found that the federal agency was simply 
managing its own land to maximize its value for the public benefit.173 
The two analyses evoke the sort of utilitarian calculus that justified strip 
mining on Navajo lands. 
Another example of hermeneutical injustice arose when a Native 
Hawaiian group, the Hui Mālama, filed a claim against the U.S. 
Department of Navy and the Bishop Museum to protect ancestral human 
remains from desecration in connection with the scientific study of the 
remains authorized for purposes of preparing an inventory under the 
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act.174 Hui 
Mālama asserted that the federal defendants had violated federal law by 
undertaking scientific research on the remains, and they feared that the 
study record would be disclosed to third parties pursuant to requests 
under the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).175 The Native 
claimants argued that the public release of this data, including 
photographs of the remains, would cause a profound and serious harm to 
the ancestral remains, which maintained an essence as living beings, and 
to their descendants.176 
The court declined to recognize this claim, finding that although the 
ancestral remains were “living” entities within the indigenous belief 
system, they were merely de-identified human skeletal remains for 
purposes of the privacy exemption within FOIA.177 The Hawaiian case 
exemplifies a form of testimonial injustice because the court failed to see 
the relevance of the Native claimants’ testimony to establishing an 
                                                     
170. Id. at 447–51.  
171. Id.  
172. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1072.  
173. Id. at 1073. 
174. Na Iwi O Na Kupuna O Mokapu v. Dalton, 894 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Haw. 1995).  
175. Id. at 1402–04. 
176. Id. at 1409. 
177. Id. at 1413. 
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actionable claim. The case also demonstrates a form of hermeneutical 
injustice because the Native Hawaiian claimants were structurally 
excluded from creating a shared meaning for the doctrine of privacy, 
which would operate to protect a living person’s body from being 
photographed and put on public display without the individual’s consent. 
A final example of hermeneutical injustice can be seen in a very 
current event. The Native Village of Kivilina is losing its entire land 
base as a result of global climate change and sea level rise.178 Thus far, 
the Native Village of Kivilina has not prevailed in its attempt to sue 
several oil companies for the harm of public nuisance.179 This is because 
the courts have been unable to find any particular liability given the 
multiple interactions that are responsible for rising levels of greenhouse 
gas emissions.180 Indeed, no cause of action currently exists for the loss 
of an entire nation, as many island nations in the South Pacific, such as 
Tuvalu, are discovering.181 It is simply outside the realm of our current 
understanding, as a global community, to fathom the loss of a sovereign 
nation’s entire land base by a “natural” phenomenon like flooding, as 
opposed to military conquest.182 
All of these cases raise issues of hermeneutical injustice because the 
harms asserted include cultural and spiritual claims that do not fall 
within an available category of experience or thought within the Western 
legal system. However, the harms are felt by indigenous peoples. This is 
their experience, and it is shared among many different indigenous 
groups because they possess a different understanding of the world. 
Each of these indigenous claimants has faced structural prejudice 
because they are forced to bring their cause of action under standard 
categories of American law that do not reflect a shared understanding of 
their social experience, including the asserted harms or benefits of 
particular types of conduct. In each of these cases, science has been 
utilized to prove the “truth” of a claim for harm. So, for example, 
science can measure and quantify the level of a toxic emission that 
poisons water or kills fish or wildlife. However, science cannot measure 
                                                     
178. Native Vill. of Kivilina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 
696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).  
179. Kivilina, 696 F.3d at 853.  
180. Id. at 854–58. 
181. See Tsosie, supra note 111 (discussing potential human rights claims that might be 
developed by Island nations in the South Pacific and by indigenous nations in the Arctic who are in 
jeopardy of losing their land base and their subsistence ways of life).  
182. See Kivilina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 880–82 (discussing the difficulty of establishing causation 
for the purpose of Article III standing when global warming is attributed to numerous entities over 
centuries).  
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the value of “culture” to a people, and consequently, there is no 
scientific method to establish “cultural harm.” Thus, the destruction of a 
culture or a religion is not legally actionable. Similarly, science can 
“prove” that Class I-treated effluent is “safe” for a recreational skier on 
the San Francisco Peaks, although science cannot prove the “spiritual 
contamination” that will result from the discharge of mortuary fluids into 
the reclaimed municipal water source used to create artificial snow. Nor 
can science prove that the San Francisco Peaks themselves have a sacred 
essence and identity as a living spiritual being or that ancestral human 
remains have such qualities. In each case, Western science’s limited 
framework is used to justify the exclusion of Native experience for 
purposes of establishing a legal cause of action. 
D.  Structural Forms of Epistemic Injustice Impair Equal Citizenship 
Why should American society care about these structural deficiencies 
within its pluralistic democracy? Fricker argues that the capacity to give 
knowledge is a fundamental capacity of human beings.183 When a 
society treats some groups as incapable of giving knowledge on an equal 
basis, it treats those groups as less than fully human, an intrinsic harm.184 
Society also hinders the groups’ further development by discounting 
their intellectual abilities, an epistemic harm.185 As illustrated by the 
Doctrine of Discovery and its incorporation into U.S. law, American 
legal and educational institutions have historically treated Western 
knowledge as a privileged form of knowledge, discounting the ability of 
indigenous peoples to generate knowledge or convey it in process of 
public policy discourse.186 In the process, American society has 
prevented indigenous peoples from articulating their own social 
experience, including the harms they have experienced as a result of the 
dominant society’s public policies. 
Fricker also encourages societies to care about epistemic justice as an 
intellectual or moral virtue.187 Intellectual virtues generally have truth as 
their ultimate end, which may be one reason why contemporary 
scientists claim a value in studying indigenous knowledge. For example, 
some scientists contend that traditional knowledge is of potential utility 
to understand biodiversity and its management through adaptation plans, 
                                                     
183. FRICKER, supra note 7, at 44. 
184. Id. at 44–45. 
185. Id. at 44. 
186. See supra notes 46–91 and accompanying text. 
187. FRICKER, supra note 7, at 120–21. 
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as well as to obtain knowledge about medicinal plants that might be used 
to develop pharmaceutical products.188 The utility of indigenous peoples’ 
traditional knowledge will be “proven” when it accords with Western 
science, which is why scientists are now pushing to undertake research 
studies on traditional knowledge.189 
While intellectual virtue is important, the dominant society must be 
aware that its desire to use indigenous knowledge as a means to achieve 
a broad public benefit has often resulted in the exploitation of 
indigenous peoples. For example, the pharmaceutical company typically 
profits from its ability to patent products derived from indigenous 
peoples’ knowledge of plants.190 However, intellectual property laws do 
not protect indigenous knowledge,191 which means that indigenous 
peoples have no way to protect against misuse or misappropriation of 
their traditional knowledge. This is largely because U.S. intellectual 
property laws protect only new “innovations” and “discoveries,” and 
they do not protect the longstanding knowledge held by cultural 
communities.192 
Fricker compares intellectual virtue with the virtue of compassion, 
which is a moral virtue designed to alleviate the suffering of others and 
motivate their well-being.193 An ethic of compassion suggests that we 
utilize a human rights framework to improve the position of indigenous 
peoples within society.194 This would ideally move them out of a 
position of disadvantage and powerlessness while honoring the U.S. 
Constitution’s stated commitment to protect human dignity and 
equality.195 Presumably, indigenous peoples would then be able to enjoy 
                                                     
188. See generally John Reid, Comment, Biopiracy: The Struggle for Traditional Knowledge 
Rights, 34 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 77 (2010).  
189. Several policymakes explicitly made this point at a recent international conference on 
climate adaptation attended by this author. See, e.g., Panels at Climate Adaptation Futures: Second 
International Climate Change Adaptation Conference (May 29–31, 2012).  
190. Reid, supra note 188, at 90.  
191. Tsosie, supra note 1, at 398–99. 
192. Id. at 399. 
193. See FRICKER, supra note 7, at 126 (distinguishing intellectual virtues from ethical virtues 
and observing that the latter set of virtues are oriented toward the well-being of others). 
194. Human rights law, after all, is premised upon a Kantian notion of equal respect for persons. 
See generally Jeremy Waldron, How Law Protects Dignity (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & 
Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11-83, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1973341. To the extent that public policies 
overtly disadvantage minority groups and cause suffering, human rights law counsels nation-states 
to act affirmatively to remedy this discrimination.  
195. I use the terms “disadvantage” and “powerless” in their political sense. Although there is a 
popular belief that Native peoples now enjoy economic power, the benefits of Indian gaming are 
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the equal citizenship espoused by American democracy. 
III.   CONTEMPORARY CASE STUDIES INVOLVING 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SCIENCE POLICY 
Advances in science and technology hold a great deal of promise for 
resolving some of the most difficult challenges that confront us in the 
contemporary era. However, they also pose significant ethical issues, 
particularly in view of the considerable disparities between populations 
and nations in their overall capacity to experience the benefits of 
technology. In the United States, Native peoples are implicated in public 
policy as U.S. citizens and as citizens of sovereign nations.196 Individual 
Indians enjoy “equal citizenship” in common with all other United States 
citizens,197 and yet they also have a “differentiated” citizenship because 
of their membership within tribal Nations that possess a trust 
relationship with the United States government.198 
These different status relationships are the basis for different rights 
claims. In their capacity as U.S. citizens, individual Indians have the 
right to enjoy the same liberties as other citizens, including state 
services.199 The rights that derive from the federal trust relationship, 
however, are different in character. These are political rights that are 
expressed collectively through the government-to-government 
relationship between the Native Nations and the United States.200 Such 
rights may be reflected in treaties or other constitutive agreements, and 
they often manifest in a reservation land base, generally held in trust for 
the benefit of the tribe and its members.201 They may also be reflected in 
the tribes’ associated interests in water, timber, and wildlife resources.202 
This section of the Article will discuss the ways in which the 
sovereign rights of Native Nations are impacted by U.S. public policy. In 
                                                     
concentrated on relatively few tribes, and the structural inequities that I am discussing in this article 
are pervasive and cannot be remedied by wealth transfers. 
196. See Tsosie, supra note 96, at 201. 
197. See Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2006) (granting citizenship to all 
Indians born in the United States).  
198. See Tsosie, supra note 96, at 202.  
199. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV, § 1.  
200. United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 506 (2003); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).  
201. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986) (“As a general rule, Indians enjoy 
exclusive treaty rights to hunt and fish on lands reserved to them . . . .”).  
202. See generally Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); see 
also United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 224 (1983).  
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particular, the Article identifies three areas where science policy 
continues to heavily impact the rights and interests of indigenous 
peoples. While the doctrines governing the specific areas differ, there is 
consistency in the themes that have driven national policy over the years 
as well as their impact on Native peoples. The three areas are 
environmental policy, health policy, and repatriation policy. These are 
vast areas of public policy, and this Article does not attempt to give a 
comprehensive account of any one area. Nor does the Article purport to 
make the broad argument that the Doctrine of Discovery has perpetuated 
a dominant colonial attitude in every aspect of U.S. public policy to the 
detriment of Indian tribes, although other commentators have 
persuasively made this case.203 Rather, this Article selectively discusses 
aspects of these policies within their historical context in order to 
illustrate the ways in which these policies intersect and impact Native 
peoples. In all three areas, the policymakers have excluded or 
disregarded the unique interests of Native peoples, causing structural 
forms of epistemic harm to tribal governments and Native communities. 
A.  Environmental Policy 
Within the United States, domestic policy has traditionally employed 
a utilitarian calculus to determine the respective rights of Native peoples 
and the United States to the lands and resources that were at one time 
wholly governed by indigenous law.204 This is demonstrated in 
nineteenth century public land policy and in the twentieth century 
policies governing environmental regulation and energy development. 
1.  The Legacy of Nineteenth Century Land Policy 
Nineteenth century federal Indian policy supported the notion that the 
manifest destiny of the United States was to settle western lands. This 
settlement occurred by facilitating homesteading rights out of the 
expansive “public domain.”205 As detailed above, U.S. public land policy 
                                                     
203. See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus’s Legacy: The Rehnquist Court’s Perpetuation 
of European Cultural Racism Against American Indian Tribes, 39 FED. B. NEWS & J. 358, 363–65 
(1992) (arguing that even the modern application of U.S. law to Indian tribes is influenced by the 
law’s racist roots); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of 
Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219, 
222 (1986) (arguing from a historical perspective that the Euro-centric legal system subjugates 
American Indian culture and traditions).  
204. See Tsosie, supra note 22, at 262–64 (discussing utilitarian framework that has governed 
resources development in U.S.).  
205. See GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 44 
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was an outgrowth of the Doctrine of Discovery, which accorded 
paramount title to the European sovereigns and their successors in 
interest while relegating tribal property interests to the status of a right of 
occupancy that the United States could extinguish by purchase or 
conquest.206 The United States engaged in a treaty process with Native 
peoples until Congress ended this practice in 1871.207 The United States 
effectuated land cessions after that time by negotiating agreements with 
Indian nations, which were then formalized by congressional statutes.208 
However, the idea of consensual political bargain gave way to political 
force after the Supreme Court’s 1903 decision in Lone Wolf v. 
Hitchcock.209 In this opinion, the Supreme Court held that the United 
States had the power to unilaterally abrogate an Indian treaty and open 
tribal lands to non-Indian settlement, and the Court denied the tribal 
claimants any relief, finding that this was a “political question” not 
amenable to judicial review.210 The Supreme Court ultimately modified 
this ruling in 1980, when it decided a case that raised a similar issue in 
the context of a federal statute that appropriated land from the Lakota 
Nation.211 In United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians,212 the Supreme 
Court upheld congressional power to abrogate Indian treaties and to 
control the disposition of tribal property in its role as trustee, so long as 
it provided the Nations with “equivalent value.”213 However, the Court 
held that Congress’s power as a trustee should not be conflated with its 
power of eminent domain.214 Therefore, government “takings” of 
federally protected tribal land for a “public use” were subject to payment 
of “just compensation” under the Fifth Amendment.215 
The Lone Wolf decision is the judicial equivalent of many nineteenth 
century federal policies that placed tribal governments under the 
domination of the U.S. government. In 1830, Congress enacted 
                                                     
(3d ed. 1993).  
206. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).  
207. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 20, at 25 (discussing The Appropriations Act of Mar. 3, 1871, 
ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (1871) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 81 (2006)), which provided that Indian 
nations would no longer be treated as independent nations through treaties).  
208. Id. 
209. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).  
210. Id. at 568. 
211. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).  
212. Id. 
213. Id. at 416. 
214. Id. at 408. 
215. Id. at 422. 
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legislation authorizing the removal of many Indian nations from their 
traditional lands and placing the tribes on small federal “reservations” 
under the control of federal superintendents.216 The Dawes Allotment 
Act of 1887217 went a step further, authorizing Congress to allot tribal 
reservations to individual tribal members and then release the “surplus” 
lands for non-Indian settlement.218 Like the Removal Act of 1830, the 
Dawes Allotment Act of 1887 contemplated specific agreements with 
each affected tribe.219 However, the 1903 Lone Wolf opinion disregarded 
the need for tribal consent, authorizing Congress to unilaterally override 
existing treaties to force the allotment of reservations and release 
“surplus” lands.220 Not surprisingly, the combined effect of the Dawes 
Act and the Supreme Court’s authorization of unilateral treaty 
abrogation resulted in a staggering loss of two-thirds of the tribal land 
base from 1887 to 1934, when Congress ended the allotment policy.221 
The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) was the federal administrative 
entity responsible for implementing the allotment policy.222 The BIA 
started out in the Department of War and then was transferred to the 
Interior Department in 1849.223 In the nineteenth century, the BIA 
promulgated federal administrative regulations to “civilize” and 
“Christianize” the Indian people.224 These orders disrupted every aspect 
of tribal self-government, including the tribes’ ability to educate their 
children or engage in traditional cultural practices, including religious 
and healing practices.225 Although these policies would clearly violate 
                                                     
216. The Removal Act of 1830 generally authorized the removal of Indian tribes from their lands. 
Because these removals were anticipated to be “consensual,” they were effectuated through treaties 
with the specific tribes slated for removal and then codified in statutes that implemented the treaties. 
See, e.g., Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830); Treaty with the Cherokee, U.S.-
Cherokee, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478.  
217. Dawes General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 
25 U.S.C. §§ 331–333 (2000)) (repealed 2000).  
218. Id.  
219. Id.  
220. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565–66 (1903).  
221. Tribal landholdings dropped from 138 million acres in 1887 to 24 million acres in 1934 
when the Indian Reorganization Act formally ended the federal allotment policy. GOLDBERG ET AL., 
supra note 20, at 30.  
222. Dawes General Allotment Act ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388. 
223. Alyce Adams, The Road Not Taken: How Tribes Choose Between Tribal and Indian Health 
Service Management of Health Care Resources, 24 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 21, 22 (2000). 
224. See, e.g., RULES FOR COURTS OF INDIAN OFFENSES (1892), reprinted in ROBERT T. 
ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 103, 103–05 (2d ed. 2010); 
see also GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 20, at 579. 
225. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 224, at 101–02.  
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the Bill of Rights if applied to American citizens, Indian people were 
officially considered wards of the U.S. government and were not 
admitted to citizenship status until 1924.226 This meant that the federal 
policies banning Native religion or forcibly removing Indian children to 
federal military-style boarding schools were permissible as secular 
policies of “civilization” applied to “wards” of the federal 
government.227 If applied to U.S. citizens, these laws would have been 
held unconstitutional under the First Amendment or the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.228 
2.  Twentieth Century Policies Governing Environmental Regulation 
and Energy Development Emerge from Nineteenth Century 
Federal Land Policy 
In terms of environmental policy, the BIA administered tribal lands 
through many of the same policies that pertained to federal public lands, 
including leasing lands for mineral and timber exploitation at below-
market rates.229 Unlike the treatment of federal public lands, however, 
the tribal governments were the designated legal beneficiaries of these 
lands,230 and tribal members actually resided on the lands that were 
opened for timber harvesting and mineral exploitation.231 For many 
years, tribal lands were treated as resource colonies for the benefit of the 
United States.232 This policy was exploitive but entirely consistent with 
                                                     
226. The Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 conferred citizenship on all non-citizen American 
Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States. Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 
233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2006)). Prior to this time, 
some Indians were naturalized to U.S. citizenship by specific laws, such as those admitting veterans 
of the U.S. armed services to citizenship and those allowing Indian women who married non-Indian 
citizens to take the status of their husbands. However, most remained non-citizens until the 
enactment of the 1924 statute.  
227. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 20.  
228. The First Amendment protects individual rights to free speech, freedom of association, and 
religious freedom. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause provides that no one shall be 
“deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” and contains procedural and 
substantive protections.  
229. Tsosie, supra note 22, at 300–01.  
230. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 17.01, at 1074–75 (Nell Jessup Newton et 
al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter COHEN].  
231. See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 205, at 55 (observing that trial trust lands are not “public 
lands” because they must be managed on behalf of the Indian tribes and individuals as beneficiaries, 
but also noting that tribal lands cannot be disassociated from public land policy because both are 
administered under the authority of the Department of Interior (DOI) and DOI leasing and land 
management policies are consistent in many respects).  
232. Tsosie, supra note 22. 
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the “wardship” status of Indian nations.233 The environmental and health 
consequences of these policies, which lasted until the 1970s, devastated 
many tribal communities.234 
The best example of the ways in which national policies governing 
energy development on public lands combined to impact the Native 
peoples’ health and environment comes from the U.S. policies 
promoting uranium production on federal and tribal lands in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.235 In the late nineteenth century, the 
U.S. began uranium exploration and found rich deposits throughout the 
Southwest.236 In 1939, the U.S. government began active exploration of 
uranium on the Navajo reservation and began a classified survey of the 
Colorado Plateau in 1942, including covert mining.237 After World War 
II, the U.S. Congress enacted the 1946 Atomic Energy Act, which 
established the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).238 AEC controlled 
the uranium industry, and all uranium mined within the U.S. had to be 
sold to the AEC.239 In the 1950s, the BIA approved leases of Navajo 
land to select companies, authorizing them to mine uranium within the 
Navajo Nation.240 The BIA instructed the tribal council that this was a 
beneficial industry that would employ many Navajo workers.241 
The U.S. Public Health Service conducted the first studies of uranium 
mining on the Navajo Nation in 1949.242 Although scientists already 
knew the health impacts of radioactive exposure, and precautionary 
measures were available,243 these protections were not made available to 
Navajo workers.244 Furthermore, the Navajo workers were not informed 
                                                     
233. Id. 
234. Id. at 302–03.  
235. See INDIANS AND ENERGY: EXPLOITATION AND OPPORTUNITY IN THE AMERICAN 
SOUTHWEST 15 (Sherry L. Smith & Brian Frehner eds., 2010) [hereinafter INDIANS AND ENERGY]. 
236. Tsosie, supra note 2, at 218 n.208 (citing Barbara Rose Johnston & Susan Dawson, 
Resource Use and Abuse on Native American Land: Uranium Mining in the American Southwest, in 
WHO PAYS THE PRICE: THE SOCIOCULTURAL CONTEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 142, 144 
(Barbara Rose Johnston ed., 1994)).  
237. Id.  
238. Barbara Rose Johnston, Susan Dawson & Gary Madsen, Uranium Mining and Milling: 
Navajo Experiences in the American Southwest, in INDIANS AND ENERGY, supra note 235, at 111, 
115. 
239. Id. at 117. 
240. Id.  
241. Id.  
242. Id. at 116.  
243. Id. at 118–20. 
244. Id. at 120. 
07 - Tsosie Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2012  7:38 PM 
1170 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:1133 
 
about the hazards of their jobs, including the need to change clothing 
before they returned home to their families.245 Navajo miners breathed 
the air and drank the water contaminated by the radioactive ore.246 None 
of this was disclosed to the Navajo Nation, and the U.S. government 
continued to approve contracts with mining companies, touting uranium 
production as tribal economic development and jobs creation.247 
The health studies continued without the knowledge of the tribe or 
tribal members.248 In 1952, another health study documented the high 
mortality rate among uranium miners from lung cancer.249 Again, this 
was not disclosed for fear that the Navajo workers would quit their jobs 
if they knew.250 The AEC monitored the economics of uranium 
exploitation for the benefit of the U.S. military, and it took the position 
that it had no responsibility for worker health or safety.251 
In 1971, federal law shifted to favor the use of nuclear energy by 
commercial operators.252 Because commercial operators were now the 
purchasers of uranium, the health impacts were of direct relevance to 
laborers.253 Thus, the impacts of uranium mining on Native workers and 
their families became the subject of multiple Congressional hearings.254 
Congress ultimately enacted the 1990 Radiation Exposure Compensation 
Act, which was amended in 2000.255 This Act provided limited 
compensation to miners or to their widows if they met a stringent set of 
requirements intended to document the direct causal relationship 
between the mining practices and the death or disease that caused them 
harm.256 The legislation only compensated individuals who could meet 
the tort standard for liability.257 It thus did not compensate the Navajo 
Nation for the harm and injury caused to its land and to many Navajo 
                                                     
245. Id.  
246. Tsosie, supra note 2, at 219. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. 
249. Id.  
250. See id. (noting that the mining companies would not provide employee lists until the United 
States Public Health Service (USPHS) agreed that its doctors would not divulge the potential health 
hazards to the workers, nor would they inform those who became ill that their illnesses were 
radiation related). 
251. Id. at 117.  
252. Johnston, Dawson, & Madsen, supra note 238, at 111, 120. 
253. Id. at 120. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. at 111–12. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. 
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people, including the future generations who would suffer from 
radioactive exposure.258 
Federal policy shifted again in the latter part of the 1970s in the wake 
of nuclear spills and public outcry.259 Federal policy began to both 
minimize the role of nuclear power as an energy source and amplify the 
role of coal, oil, and gas exploration.260 These industries have also 
caused environmental impacts for the Navajo Nation and other energy 
resource tribes,261 but they are often supported by tribal leaders as one of 
the sole mechanisms for tribal economic development.262 
This case study of energy development on the Navajo Nation 
highlights the way in which the U.S. government used science policy to 
enhance its capacity to mine uranium at the lowest price possible in 
order to serve the “greater good,” namely, the “national security” interest 
of the U.S. Although the harms to human health and to the environment 
were well-documented by existing science, the U.S. government did not 
disclose this to the Navajo Nation in a way that would enable that 
government to protect its lands and members. 
U.S. public health officials instead conducted a covert “medical 
experiment” on the Navajo people, reminiscent of the infamous 
Tuskegee Experiment,263 to document the effects of uranium exposure 
on human beings.264 In addition, the U.S. government failed to take an 
                                                     
258. See id. at 112, 125–27 (discussing long term effects of uranium mining in the context of the 
“Millworkers Study”). 
259. See id. at 122 (discussing the impact of the 1979 United Nuclear Corporation dam failure 
near Church Rock, New Mexico, among other mining-related crises).  
260. Id. 
261. Andrew Needham, “A Piece of the Action:” Navajo Nationalism, Energy Development, and 
Metropolitan Inequality, in INDIANS AND ENERGY, supra note 235, at 111, 115. 
262. For example, the Hopi Tribal government and the Navajo Nation endorse continued 
production of coal on their respective reservations and the operation of the coal-fired power plants 
that employ many tribal members, despite the pollution that naturally results from these industries, 
because there are very few options for employment in this rural area of the Southwest.  
263. In 1932, the USPHS commenced the Tuskegee Syphilis study to document the nature of 
syphilis, including its progression in human beings. The subjects of the study were 399 black 
sharecroppers in Alabama who had latent syphilis and 201 men without the disease, who constituted 
the control group. The physicians who conducted the study did not inform the men about their 
disease or provide treatment. They did provide meals, medical exams, and burial insurance to ensure 
that the men did not seek treatment elsewhere. The study operated covertly until news sources 
revealed the story in 1972. After significant national embarrassment, the federal government ended 
the study and initiated policy changes to provide protection for human subjects of medical research. 
Myrtle Adams et al., Final Report of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee—May 20, 
1996, UNIV. of VA. CLAUDE MOORE HEALTH SCI. LIBR., 
http://www.hsl.virginia.edu/historical/medical_history/bad_blood/report.cfm (last visited July 12, 
2012). 
264. See id. (discussing the radiation experiments funded by the U.S. government from 1944 to 
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active role in remediating the harm after the uranium mining companies 
pulled out of active operation, leaving huge piles of uranium tailings and 
holding ponds of radioactive waste.265 
In 1979, one of the mud dams that contained a holding pond near 
Church Rock, New Mexico, burst, spilling 1100 tons of uranium tailings 
and an estimated 100 million gallons of radioactive wastewater into the 
Rio Puerco River.266 Experts have cited this spill as the largest nuclear 
spill in U.S. history, and it caused extensive damage to local Navajo 
families, including the loss of their livestock, which were poisoned by 
drinking the radioactive water.267 The Navajo plaintiffs attempted to sue 
United Nuclear Corporation in tribal court, but the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the Navajo plaintiffs were preempted from doing so by the 
Price-Anderson Act.268 The Price-Anderson Act is a federal statute that 
limits the liability of any company engaged in nuclear energy production 
for the harm or damage caused by its activity.269 It is a complicated 
statute that creates a high burden for plaintiffs to prove causation and 
establishes a cap on the damages they can receive upon meeting that 
burden.270 Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled that a federal court 
must decide cases under this statute using the “neutral laws” and 
“scientific evidence” promoted by federal policy.271 In short, the Navajo 
Nation and its members are divested of any authority to redress the 
harms they have suffered from uranium mining, other than the very 
narrow set of claims that Congress has authorized. 
This profound legacy of federally-authorized radioactive 
contamination inspired the Navajo Nation to enact its own law, the Diné 
Natural Resources Protection Act of 2005.272 This law, among other 
things, prohibits all uranium mining within the Navajo Indian 
Country.273 The Navajo Indian Country is defined to extend to lands 
within the “checkerboard” area, an area in the state of New Mexico that 
                                                     
1974 to study the effects of radiation exposure on human populations, and noting that these studies 
were typically conducted without the patient’s awareness or consent to participate). Uranium miners 
were among the human subjects tested in the radiation experiments. 
265. Johnston, Dawson & Madsen, supra note 238, at 122. 
266. Tsosie, supra note 2, at 220 (citing Bradford D. Cooley, The Navajo Uranium Ban: Tribal 
Sovereignty v. National Energy Demands, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 393 (2006)).  
267. Id. 
268. See El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 485–86 (1999).  
269. Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2297h (2006).  
270. 42 U.S.C. § 2210. 
271. See El Paso Natural Gas Co., 526 U.S. at 485–86.  
272. NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 1303 (2005).  
273. Id. 
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is comprised of fee lands and tribally owned lands that is populated 
virtually exclusively by Navajo people.274 The checkerboard area 
exemplifies the mixed land titles within the exterior boundaries of many 
Indian reservations caused by nineteenth century federal land grants to 
the railroad companies intended to promote westward expansion. Today, 
the checkerboard area claimed by the Navajo Nation is the focus of 
jurisdictional disputes caused by private companies seeking permits to 
drill for uranium on parcels of non-Indian owned fee land within the 
area.275 In accordance with the jurisdictional rules of federal Indian law, 
if the land in this area is “Indian Country,” then the EPA maintains 
primary permitting authority in cooperation with the Navajo Nation.276 If 
the land is not “Indian Country,” then the State of New Mexico may 
authorize drilling for uranium on privately-owned or state-owned lands 
in the area but not on any lands still held in “Indian title.”277 
The jurisdictional issues are currently being litigated in the federal 
courts.278 In Hydro Resources, Inc. v. EPA,279 the Tenth Circuit, sitting 
en banc, held that a parcel of fee land owned by Hydro Resources, Inc. 
within Section 8 of the checkerboard area was not a “dependent Indian 
community” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b).280 This holding 
reversed the EPA’s land status determination and overruled an earlier 
Tenth Circuit panel opinion in the same case holding that the area was a 
“dependent Indian community” within the meaning of the federal statute 
defining “Indian country.”281 Section 8 falls within the Church Rock 
Chapter of the Navajo Nation, an area comprised of over seventy-five 
percent trust land, both tribal and allotted, with a population that is 
ninety-eight percent Navajo.282 These demographics supported the 
                                                     
274. NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 254. 
275. See generally HRI, Inc. v. EPA, 198 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding private company 
was subject to federal permitting on fee land within Navajo Nation).  
276. See, e.g., Wash. Dep’t of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465, 1469–72 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(explaining the intersection of federal Indian law with environmental law in the context of the 
respective regulatory authority of the states, the EPA, and tribal governments); see also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1151 (2006) (defining “Indian Country” for jurisdictional purposes). 
277. Cf. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 752 F.2d at 1472 (holding that the EPA appropriately refused to 
allow the State of Washington to apply its hazardous waste regulations to Indian lands).  
278. For an excellent analysis of the current litigation within its historical context, see Claire R. 
Newman, Creating an Environmental No-Man’s Land: The Tenth Circuit’s Departure from 
Environmental and Indian Law Protecting a Tribal Community’s Health and Environment, 1 WASH. 
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 352, 356–401 (2011).  
279. 608 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc).  
280. Id. at 1166. 
281. Id.  
282. Id. at 1168–69 (Ebel, J., dissenting). 
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EPA’s finding that any permits to mine uranium in the area would 
require the approval of the Navajo Nation and EPA.283 The Tenth 
Circuit’s en banc opinion found, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government284 
should be interpreted as negating the “community of reference” test, 
which includes an analysis of population demographics.285 The circuit 
court thus ruled that the parcel of land should be considered in isolation 
from the remainder of the land within the Church Rock Chapter of the 
Navajo Nation.286 
The finding that non-Indian ownership of a parcel of fee land justifies 
state jurisdiction obviously constrains the jurisdiction of the Navajo 
Nation to protect its lands and members. In addition, the controlling 
politics is based on the same utilitarian calculus that was responsible for 
the initial harms of uranium mining on the Navajo Nation. In this case, 
many policymakers now assert that nuclear energy is “green energy” and 
uranium production should be expanded in order to minimize the 
greenhouse gas emissions.287 Assuming that the argument is defensible, 
the costs of uranium mining will fall disproportionately upon the people 
who live on or near the lands that will be mined. Unlike state- or federal-
public lands, reservation lands are the home of many Native peoples. 
Companies such as Hydro Resources, Inc. tout new methods of drilling 
for uranium as “safe” technologies,288 but there is insufficient 
information to substantiate this claim.289 
Because the Navajo Nation possesses an estimated twenty-five 
percent of the recoverable uranium in this country, the Nation will bear 
the brunt of a national energy development policy that promotes uranium 
mining.290 For example, in another recent Tenth Circuit decision, Morris 
v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,291 the court upheld the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s decision to grant Hydro Resources, 
                                                     
283. See id. at 1139. 
284. 522 U.S. 520, 532–34 (1998). 
285. See Hydro Res., 608 F.3d at 1135, 1141. 
286. Id. at 1166. 
287. See Patrick Moore, Going Nuclear, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2006, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/14/AR2006041401209.html 
(portraying nuclear energy as the wave of the future and the dangers of uranium mining remedied).  
288. Tsosie, supra note 2, at 224. 
289. I think it is safe to say that we don’t “know” that this is a safe technology. There are no 
studies on this in relation to human health, and we don’t want to resurrect the “radiation 
experiments” of the 1950s. 
290. Tsosie, supra note 2, at 218 n.206.  
291. 598 F.3d 677 (10th Cir. 2010). 
07 - Tsosie Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2012  7:38 PM 
2012] INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE 1175 
 
Inc. a source-materials license for its uranium mining operation on 
Section 17 within the Church Rock Chapter.292 In Section 17, the 
existing radiation levels already exceed the maximum exposure limits, 
and it is unclear whether groundwater contamination can be 
remediated.293 The Navajo residents of the Church Rock Chapter rely 
upon the groundwater to supply drinking water for themselves and their 
livestock.294 Thus, the risk of harm posed by uranium mining within the 
checkerboard area falls disproportionately upon the Navajo people, 
while the primary jurisdictional authority resides with the state and 
federal governments. 
In short, national energy and environmental policies continue to 
dominate the future of Indian nations and tribal lands under a Western 
policy model that combines economics and science to determine what is 
best for “American society.” What about the health impacts on tribal 
members? Again, it is science that measures risk and tells us what is 
“beneficial” and what is “harmful” as a matter of social policy. The 
science of “risk assessment” is often based upon assumptions of how the 
“average” U.S. citizen lives and works, rather than the lifestyles of 
Native peoples who live on reservations and may consume fish on a 
daily basis or drink water from wells adjacent to lands contaminated by 
mining waste.295 With that reality in mind, this Article will now turn to 
the issue of national health policy and its impact on indigenous peoples. 
B.  U.S. Health Policy 
U.S. public health policy and the policies that drive health research 
and facilitate biotechnology rely heavily upon scientific data. In this area 
of public policy, new scientific discoveries are seen as a social good and 
are often rewarded by patents for new medicines and technologies. 
Admittedly, there is not a direct linkage between the patenting of new 
discoveries in the area of health technology and the nineteenth century 
Discovery Doctrine that appropriated Native lands for public use. 
However, as this section of the Article will demonstrate, U.S. health 
policy, like U.S. public land policy, has significantly affected Native 
peoples since the earliest days of this country’s history, and its use of 
                                                     
292. Id. at 684–705. 
293. Id. at 684, 695. 
294. Tsosie, supra note 2, at 224; see also Morris, 598 F.3d at 682. 
295. Richard A. Du Bey & James M. Grijalva, Closing the Circle: Tribal Implementation of the 
Superfund Program in the Reservation Environment, 9 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 279, 288–
89 (1993–1994).  
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science and economics similarly continues to affect tribal interests in 
ways that are often invisible to the dominant society. 
1.  U.S. Public Health Policy and Native Peoples 
Because tribal governments enjoy a distinctive political status under 
federal law, the Indian Health Service and its policies heavily govern 
tribal access to health care.296 In this sense, U.S. health policy affects 
Native peoples more than other Americans, just as U.S. public land 
policy disproportionately impacts Native peoples. Today, U.S. health 
policy also recognizes Native Americans as “minority populations” who 
suffer from significant health disparities, as do many other minority 
groups.297 The cause of these disparities is the topic of many articles and 
theories, but it is clear that the nineteenth century federal policies, which 
appropriated Native lands and resources for public use and forced tribes 
to transition from their traditional land-based economies to dependency 
upon federal commodities, provided the initial cause of the Native 
people’s health care disparities.298 This connection between U.S. public 
land policy and U.S. health policy would be invisible to most 
Americans, but it continues to play an important role in the Native 
peoples’ quality of life. 
Today, the overwhelming poverty within many reservation 
communities and the prevalence of alcohol and tobacco use exacerbates 
the health disparities faced by tribal members.299 Reservation 
communities tend to be rural and isolated, and therefore residents lack 
access to the healthy foods and fitness facilities that suburban American 
citizens enjoy.300 In addition, poor road conditions and marginal access 
to hospitals and trauma facilities contribute to higher than average 
mortality rates attributable to accidents and injuries on the 
reservations.301 
                                                     
296. See Indian Health Care Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 94-437, § 2(a), 90 Stat. 1400, 1400 
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006)). 
297. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTHCARE DISPARITIES REPORT, 2009 180–233 (2010) [hereinafter 
NATIONAL HEALTHCARE DISPARITIES REPORT]. 
298. See Stephen J. Kunitz, The History and Politics of U.S. Health Care Policy for American 
Indians and Alaskan Natives, 86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1464, 1465, 1473 (1996). 
299. See generally AMERICAN INDIAN HEALTH: INNOVATIONS IN HEALTH CARE, PROMOTION, 
AND POLICY (Everett R. Rhoades ed., 2000) [hereinafter AMERICAN INDIAN HEALTH].  
300. Yvette Roubideaux, Beyond Red Lake — The Persistent Crisis in American Indian Health 
Care, 353 N. ENG. J. MED. 1881, 1882 (Nov. 3, 2005), available at http://www.nejm.org/ 
doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp058095. 
301. See generally id.; Thomas Stewart, Philip May & Anita Muneta, A Navajo Health Consumer 
 
07 - Tsosie Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2012  7:38 PM 
2012] INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE 1177 
 
According to a 1988 Report of the Institute of Medicine, public health 
policy reflects “what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the 
conditions in which people can be healthy.”302 Contemporary public 
health policy is understood to include environmental health, disease and 
injury control, involuntary testing for disease, contact tracing of disease, 
immunizations and mandatory treatment, and quarantine policies for 
persons with infectious diseases.303 The powers of the state and federal 
governments to regulate public health are generally understood to derive 
from their respective constitutional authorities304 and from the inherent-
police powers of state governments to regulate public health, safety, and 
welfare.305 
Tribal governments also possess police powers as an aspect of their 
inherent sovereignty.306 However, their unique political status under 
federal law results in a different legal framework for tribal health policy 
and sometimes in disparate rights. For example, the decision of the U.S. 
Public Health Service to covertly study the effects of radioactive 
exposure on Navajo mine workers in the 1950s indicates that Native 
American people have sometimes been treated as involuntary subjects of 
U.S. public health research experiments.307 Of course, by the 1950s, 
Indians were full citizens,308 demonstrating that even this status could 
not insulate them from the harms of U.S. policy. Rather, the Navajo 
uranium mining case evokes the past understanding of policymakers that 
Native Nations were to be treated as “wards” and political subjects of the 
U.S. Until the mid-nineteenth century, Native peoples were under the 
jurisdiction of the Department of War, which administered their health 
needs in the wake of disease epidemics, such as smallpox, measles, and 
influenza, that decimated many Native villages.309 In fact, the very first 
                                                     
Survey, 18 MED. CARE 1183 (1980).  
302. COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUB. HEALTH, INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF 
PUBLIC HEALTH 1 (1st ed. 1988). 
303. See generally F. Douglas Scutchfield & C. William Keck, Concepts and Definitions of 
Public Health Practice, in PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 3, 3–9 (Stephen J. Williams 
ed., 1997).  
304. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see generally Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) 
(finding that state authority to require compulsory vaccination is acceptable under state police 
power).   
305. U.S. CONST. amend. X; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).   
306. See generally COHEN, supra note 230, § 4.01, at 204–20. 
307. See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
308. Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2006).  
309. Rose L. Pfefferbaum et al., Providing for the Health Care Needs of Native Americans: 
Policy, Programs, Procedures, and Practices, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 211, 214 (1997).  
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federal law governing Native health was an 1819 statute designed to 
protect U.S. servicemen from contracting smallpox from Indians.310 
When the BIA was transferred to the Department of Interior (DOI), the 
DOI assumed the function of providing medical care to Indians for two 
purposes: to control disease epidemics that could jeopardize American 
citizens and to meet treaty obligations to provide physicians to tribal 
governments.311 
What about the sovereign right of tribal governments to regulate 
public health? This function of tribal self-governance was overtly 
repudiated by federal policymakers until the 1970s.312 In the latter part 
of the nineteenth century, the BIA actually outlawed traditional 
indigenous healing practices on the reservation, thereby forcing the 
Western model of medicine upon tribal governments.313 The federal 
government formalized the federal appropriation for Indian health care 
in the 1921 Snyder Act,314 causing concern about the cost of this service 
to federal taxpayers. In 1954, the Indian Health Service was transferred 
to the Department of Health and Human Services as a branch of federal 
public health policy.315 The transfer’s asserted purpose was to “improve 
health services to Indian people, to avoid duplication of public health 
services, and to further the long-range objective of integrating Indian 
people into American common life.”316 
It was not until the 1970s that federal policy formally recognized any 
distinctive role for tribal governments. The Indian Self-Determination 
and Education Assistance Act of 1975317 effectuated the new federal 
policy of self-determination for tribal governments.318 This Act allowed 
tribes to assume control over services that the federal government 
previously provided and develop new services for tribal members.319 In 
                                                     
310. Lloyd B. Miller, The Contemporary Statutory Framework for Native Healthcare, Lecture at 
the New Directions in Native Healthcare CLE Conference (Nov. 5, 2010).  
311. See generally Kunitz, supra note 298, at 1464; AMERICAN INDIAN HEALTH, supra note 299. 
312. See Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 309, at 216 (describing enactment of Indian Self-
Determination and Education Act of 1975, which provided a mechanism to transfer administrative 
authority to Tribes); see also Sharon O’Brien, Tribes and Indians: With Whom Does the United 
States Maintain a Relationship?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1461, 1467 (1991).  
313. See RULES FOR COURTS OF INDIAN OFFENSES (1892), supra note 224, at 103, 104.  
314. 25 U.S.C. § 13 (2006). 
315. Transfer Act of Aug. 5, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-568, 68 Stat. 674 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 2004 (2006)). 
316. Id. at § 102. 
317. 25 U.S.C. § 450. 
318. Id. 
319. Id; see generally Adams, supra note 223. 
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the 1990s, the federal “self-governance” policy enhanced the ability of 
tribal governments to administer their own health care systems.320 
However, many tribes lack the necessary financial resources to assume 
direct control of their health care system.321 The Indian Health Service 
continues to provide a basic level of health care to tribal members, 
although the extent of this care is somewhat dependent upon 
congressional funding cycles.322 Some tribal governments have 
successfully harnessed the revenues from gaming to assist them in 
delivering outstanding health care to tribal members within tribally-
operated reservation clinics and hospitals.323 
  Despite these modern policy innovations, a 2009 study on national 
health care disparities documents that American Indians and Alaska 
Natives rank the lowest of any population with respect to the quality of 
care they receive and the quality of their actual health outcomes.324 
Given these disparities, one would hope that the advances in health care 
that biotechnology makes possible would be utilized for the overall 
improvement of Native health. In fact, however, the historical context of 
exploitation and differential rights documented above continues to 
impact the tribes’ ability to receive benefits from contemporary health 
care innovations, including genomic research and personalized 
medicine. 
2.  Native Peoples and Health Care Innovation 
Scientists and policymakers often tout the technological advances 
represented by biotechnology as holding great public benefit,325 and yet 
they also may represent a distinctive set of harms to indigenous peoples. 
In fact, the issue of genetic research on indigenous peoples raises ethical 
issues for several different scientific disciplines, including biomedical 
research, physical anthropology, and bio-archeology.326 This became 
apparent in 2004, when the Havasupai Tribe, indigenous to the Grand 
Canyon in Northern Arizona, filed a lawsuit against Arizona State 
University for its misuse of blood samples taken from tribal members 
                                                     
320. See Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 
4250 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C. (2006)). 
321. See AMERICAN INDIAN HEALTH, supra note 299, at 79. 
322. See Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 309, at 215. 
323. In Arizona, the Gila River Indian Community exemplifies this capacity, and the tribal 
government has set a very high standard for health care on the reservation.  
324. NATIONAL HEALTHCARE DISPARITIES REPORT, supra note 297. 
325. See Tsosie, supra note 2. 
326. Id. 
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pursuant to a diabetes study.327 While the Havasupai Tribe consented to 
the diabetes study, it did not consent to the use of the samples for other 
purposes.328 The Tribe filed this lawsuit after inadvertently learning that 
the researchers had also used the samples for studies relating to 
schizophrenia and human origins.329 
Several Havasupai tribal members whose blood had been sampled in 
the study also filed a claim, alleging lack of informed consent and 
various tort harms, including emotional distress.330 Although the two 
cases were later settled out of court, the Havasupai case study raises 
important issues that continue to be unresolved, including whether a 
cause of action exists to redress the various cultural harms that tribal 
members expressed for the misuse of their blood samples, whether the 
Tribe itself could be the holder of rights to tribal-genetic resources, and 
how informed consent applies to groups as compared to individuals. 
Population genomics is vitally important to the future of biomedical 
research, as demonstrated by current innovations in bioengineering, 
personalized medicine, and pharmacogenomics.331 Thus, the issue will 
continue to be important in defining the trajectory of U.S. health policy. 
However, population genomics also supports theories about human 
origins that implicate the political status of indigenous peoples as the 
“first peoples” of specific lands. In that sense, scientific researchers seek 
to use physical samples from tribal members to prove the “truth” about 
who the tribe really is and where it originated.332 The use of tribal 
genetic material to prove the “truth” about its cultural identity is another 
example of how science is used to foster a dominant cultural view—in 
this case, about human habitation in the Americas.333 For the Havasupai 
Tribe and other tribes whose physical samples have been used in similar 
research, the scientific voyage of “discovery” continues unabated, only 
this time the tour is through the alleged “genome commons” instead of 
uncharted lands.334 In the process, indigenous understandings about their 
                                                     
327. Id. at 396. 
328. Id.  
329. Havasupai Tribe of the Havasupai Reservation v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063, 1067 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).  
330. Id. at 1071. 
331. See generally L.B. Jorde, W.S. Watkins & M.J. Bamshad, Population Genomics: A Bridge 
from Evolutionary History to Genetic Medicine, 10 HUM. MOLECULAR GENETICS 2199 (2001); J.R. 
Stinchcombe & H.E. Hoekstra, Combining Population Genomics and Quantitative Genetics: 
Finding the Genes Underlying Ecologically Important Traits, HEREDITY 158 (2008). 
332. See Tsosie, supra note 2.  
333. Id. 
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identity continue to be disregarded as “cultural” or “religious” views,335 
causing structural forms of epistemic injustice. 
In the Havasupai case, for example, scientists claimed that 
discovering the “truth” of human origins justified the use of indigenous 
peoples’ blood and tissue to prove who they really were and where they 
really came from.336 This case primarily concerned the legal issue of 
who can “own” biomedical samples removed from living human 
beings.337 However, the researchers’ argument in favor of using the 
samples for other purposes also undergirds the effort of many physical 
anthropologists and bio-archeologists to preserve “culturally 
unidentifiable” Native American human remains for scientific use, rather 
than “repatriating” them to contemporary indigenous peoples as 
“ancestral” human remains. Thus, as the next section of this Article 
demonstrates, genomic research ties directly into the nineteenth century 
trope of “discovery” that was used to justify the collection of Native 
American human remains for scientific study, again, in service of the 
“greater good” for American society. 
C.  Repatriation Policy 
Unlike the U.S. public land and public health policies, federal 
repatriation policy is quite specific to Native American people.338 
Repatriation is intended to redress the harms of a traumatic past in which 
Native human bodies and burial sites were desecrated with impunity by 
citizens and government officials alike in complete disregard of Native 
                                                     
334. This is the language used to justify the Human Genome Project in which scientists competed 
to “map” the human genome.  
335. For example, the Havasupai Tribe considers its place of origin to be in the Grand Canyon, 
while the scientific researchers are interested in proving the Tribe’s history of migrations from 
another place to the Grand Canyon. The scientific claim is presented as a search for the “truth,” 
while the Havasupai Tribe’s claim is represented as a “myth” substantiating the Tribe’s identity as 
the Original People of the Grand Canyon, which is a form of epistemic injustice at the level of an 
identity claim. 
336. See Tsosie, supra note 1, at 396. 
337. In this sense, “ownership” stands for the right to use and control the disposition of human 
tissue and biological samples. See Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 488–93 (Cal. 
1990) (holding that an individual who agreed to give blood and tissue samples in the course of 
treatment did not retain an interest in the samples sufficient to claim a share of the proceeds from a 
cell line developed by University of California researchers and patented under federal law for 
commercial use). 
338. For example, the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act specifies that it 
“reflects the unique relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribes and Native 
Hawaiian organizations and should not be construed to establish a precedent with respect to any 
other individual, organization or foreign government.” 25 U.S.C. § 3010 (2006). 
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human rights.339 The Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act of 1990 (NAGPRA) is significant because Congress 
actually took responsibility for the historic injustice to Native peoples 
caused by federal policies.340 The government’s nineteenth century 
policies treated Native Americans as objects of scientific inquiry rather 
than human beings entitled to bury their dead with dignity and possess 
cultural property as a matter of right.341 However, these human rights 
abuses also extended into American citizens’ everyday practices. Before 
the enactment of NAGPRA, citizens commonly looted Native American 
burials for the remains and objects, which were sold and transferred as 
commodities on the antiquities market.342 Although the federal 
government made sporadic attempts to regulate despoliation of federal 
lands by imposing criminal sanctions on persons who excavated public 
land without a permit, it did not attempt to regulate the commercial sale 
of Native American remains and cultural objects until NAGPRA was 
enacted in 1990.343 
1.  Overview of NAGPRA 
NAGPRA protects the rights of Native American people to four 
categories of cultural items: Native American human remains, funerary 
objects, objects of cultural patrimony, and sacred objects.344 While 
“human remains” and “funerary objects” have their standard meanings, 
what constitutes an “object of cultural patrimony” or a “sacred object” is 
dependent upon tribal law, which governs the permissible possession, 
use, or disposition of an object as “individual” or “tribal” property.345 In 
this sense, the statute can be understood as an effort to deal with 
epistemic injustice, promoting a tribal definition of protected cultural 
items instead of insisting upon categories from Anglo-American law, 
which would be unable to address the Native peoples’ social and cultural 
                                                     
339. See Rebecca Tsosie, Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act and the 
Problem of Culturally Unidentifiable Remains: The Argument for a Human Rights Framework, 44 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809 (2012).  
340. 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (2006); 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3013. 
341. Id. 
342. See Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 39–43 (1992).  
343. See Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–433 (2006); Archaeological Resources 
Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. § 470aa–mm (2006) (regulating excavations on public lands on 
the theory that the federal government owns the lands and also owns all objects or remains found on 
or under those lands). 
344. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3). 
345. Tsosie, supra note 339, at 816.  
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experience. 
NAGPRA has three primary goals. First, the statute increases the 
protections for Native American graves located on federal and tribal 
lands, providing for Native control over cultural items excavated from 
such lands after 1990.346 Second, the statute outlaws commercial 
trafficking in Native American cultural items.347 And finally, the statute 
requires all federal agencies and federally-funded museums to compile 
inventories of the Native American human remains and funerary objects 
in their possession, as well as summaries of all other cultural items.348 
These documents are then sent to all federally recognized tribes, which 
are eligible to make claims for repatriation of any of the covered items 
that are “culturally affiliated” to the tribe.349 
The statute has worked well for many tribes, enabling them to 
repatriate culturally affiliated human remains and cultural items.350 
However, the Ninth Circuit has narrowed the test of “cultural affiliation” 
in relation to ancient human remains that cannot be scientifically linked 
to a contemporary Native American group, for example, through genetic 
testing.351 Federal agencies, such as the Bureau of Land Management, 
have used this narrow definition to deny Native groups the right to 
repatriate “culturally unidentifiable” Native American human remains 
that are in the custody of museums or agencies.352 This category includes 
many boxes of Indian crania and other body parts that were housed in 
museum collections without any data to attribute the body parts to a 
particular individual or tribe.353 It also includes the remains of tribes that 
were exterminated by military conduct or disease epidemics,354 as well 
as remains of tribes that the federal government has not recognized 
under the federal acknowledgment process, even if the identity of the 
                                                     
346. 25 U.S.C. § 3002. 
347. 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (2006). 
348. 25 U.S.C. § 3003. 
349. Id. § 3005. 
350. See Cecily Harms, NAGPRA in Colorado: A Success Story, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 593, 615 
(2012) (“[O]ver 700 human remains and over 2,000 associated funerary objects [have been 
repatriated].”); Jeffrey Kluger, The Legal Battle: Archeology: Who Should Own the Bones?, TIME, 
Mar. 5, 2006, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1169901,00.html (“[T]o date, 
about 30,000 human remains and half a million funerary objects have been returned to tribes.”).  
351. See Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 879–82 (9th Cir. 2004).  
352. See Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 455 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 
1216 (D. Nev. 2006).  
353. See Tsosie, supra note 339, at 818. 
354. Id. 
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remains has a known cultural affiliation to that group.355 And, finally, it 
includes ancient remains, which are “Native American” but allegedly too 
old to affiliate to any contemporary federally-recognized tribal 
government.356 
2.  Ancient Human Remains and Contemporary Injustice 
Although NAGPRA specifically authorizes many categories of 
evidence in order to determine cultural affiliation, including the use of 
oral tradition, the standard for cultural affiliation was conflated with 
scientific analysis of “genetic” identity in the 2004 Ninth Circuit 
decision in Bonnichsen v. United States.357 That case involved a set of 
human remains—designated by the Press as “Kennewick Man”—that 
washed ashore on the Columbia River, which is under the jurisdiction of 
the Army Corps of Engineers.358 Upon first analysis, the remains seemed 
notable because they allegedly had a “Caucasian” appearance and yet 
radiocarbon dating techniques estimated them to be between 8000 and 
9000 years old.359 The five tribes that held aboriginal title claims to these 
lands made a joint claim under NAGPRA for ownership of the 
remains.360 The tribes alleged that the remains were their common 
ancestor and asserted that all five tribes shared similar cultural origins 
and understandings, despite their modern division into five separate 
governments.361 A group of scientists, including Douglas Owsley at the 
Smithsonian Museum, filed a challenge to this claim.362 The scientists 
asserted that NAGPRA should not apply to this case and that instead the 
court should consider the remains to be “federal property” for purposes 
of the federal Archaeological Resources Protection Act, which would 
make the remains available for scientific analysis and research on human 
origins.363 
                                                     
355. Id. 
356. Id. 
357. 367 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2004). 
358. See Rebecca Tsosie, Privileging Claims to the Past: Ancient Human Remains and 
Contemporary Cultural Values, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 583, 587–89 (1999). 
359. Id. at 587. 
360. Id. at 588. 
361. Id. at 601–03. 
362. Id. at 589, 589 n.19. 
363. See generally JEFF BENEDICT, NO BONE UNTURNED: INSIDE THE WORLD OF A TOP 
FORENSIC SCIENTIST AND HIS WORK ON AMERICA’S MOST NOTORIOUS CRIMES AND DISASTERS 
(2004); DAVID HURST THOMAS, SKULL WARS: KENNEWICK MAN, ARCHEOLOGY, AND THE BATTLE 
FOR NATIVE AMERICAN IDENTITY (2000).  
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The Ninth Circuit overturned the finding of the Department of Interior 
that the remains predated European contact and should be considered 
“Native American,” as well as the Secretary’s decision to transfer the 
remains to the Tribal claimants.364 The Tribal claimants had proven that 
they were the only indigenous peoples documented to have aboriginal 
title to these lands and had also produced evidence of their cultural 
affiliation to the remains based on statutorily permitted categories 
including oral history and traditional knowledge.365 However, the court 
reasoned that without proof of “genetic” similarity between the modern 
tribes and the set of remains, no “cultural” affiliation could exist to 
prove common ancestry.366 
Significantly, the court began its opinion by alluding to the set of 
remains as an important “scientific discovery” in the modern era because 
the Kennewick Man was an ancient human that predated “recorded 
history” on these lands.367 As such, this ancient individual belongs to 
“science,” which is the body of knowledge that can tell us the truth as a 
matter of genetic identity about who Kennewick Man really was and cast 
some light on the contentious issue of the “peopling of the Americas.” In 
that sense, the Bonnichsen case represents an example of epistemic 
injustice for the five claimant tribes in the Pacific Northwest that is quite 
similar to that suffered by the Havasupai Tribe. In both cases, the courts 
are reluctant to see or understand the harms suffered by the tribal 
claimants, while they are all too ready to generate an understanding of 
the law that will further scientific discovery. The testimony of the tribal 
claimants is entirely disregarded as “mythology” and “religious 
ideology,” while the scientific data represented by genetic testing is 
understood to have the capacity to tell us the “truth” about human 
origins and identity. 
Furthermore, the Bonnichsen and Havasupai cases also intersect to 
some extent with the theme of discovery, as represented by the Lewis 
and Clark Expedition. Some archaeologists continue to dispute that 
contemporary Native Americans are the “First Peoples” of the lands now 
claimed by the United States.368 Today, bio-archaeologists seek to use 
physical samples to prove the truth of their theories, requiring them to 
gather DNA samples from the remains and from the current Native 
                                                     
364. Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 882 (9th Cir. 2004). 
365. Id. at 881. 
366. Id. at 879. 
367. Id. at 868. 
368. See Tsosie, supra note 358, at 596 (detailing the theories presented in the Bonnichsen case 
about the origins of human populations in the Americas). 
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American people who claim to descend from these ancient 
individuals.369 This indicates a continuation of the nineteenth century 
policies that promoted the Lewis and Clark Expedition of “Discovery” 
and divested Native peoples of much of their land and cultural identity. 
In both the past and present, the scientific analysis of Native peoples is 
used to support the goals of the dominant society. The only difference is 
that the current process of scientific discovery relies on the biological 
samples of the study population, rather than on the data that Lewis and 
Clark gathered about the tribes’ “moral character” and capacity to be 
friends or enemies of the United States. 
3.  The Contemporary Policy Debate over Culturally Unidentifiable 
Human Remains 
The debate over who “owns” ancient human remains continues to 
affect the policies of the United States Department of Interior (DOI), 
which oversees the federal statutory process dictating the appropriate 
treatment and disposition of the vast stores of Native American human 
remains in the custody of federal agencies and federally-funded 
museums.370 In 2010, the National Park Service (NPS) within the DOI 
released a new rule providing for the respectful disposition of “culturally 
unidentifiable” Native American human remains to indigenous 
communities based on geographical and other non-genetic markers of 
“cultural” affiliation.371 The DOI issued the final rule after many failed 
prior attempts, and nearly twenty years after NAGPRA’s passage. 
Although the vast majority of Native American human remains (over 
118,000) are labeled “culturally unidentifiable,” some researchers have 
vehemently opposed the 2010 Rule, arguing that repatriation of these 
remains would foreclose human origins research that serves a broader 
public benefit.372 
Recently, a group of archaeologists filed a claim in a California state 
superior court seeking to enjoin the University of California from 
transferring sets of human remains estimated to be nearly 10,000 years 
old to the La Posta Band of Mission Indians, which has claimed cultural 
affiliation to the remains.373 The remains, designated as the “La Jolla 
                                                     
369. See Tsosie, supra note 1, at 396 (documenting that the scientific analysis of Havasupai blood 
samples was directed, in part, to human origins research). 
370. Tsosie, supra note 339, at 821.  
371. Disposition of Culturally Unidentifiable Native American Human Remains, 43 C.F.R. 
§ 10.11 (2012).  
372. See Who Owns the Past?, supra note 8.  
373. See White v. Univ. of Cal., No. C12-01978RS, at 2, 5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2012) (order 
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Skeletons,” were excavated on University property near San Diego and 
housed at the San Diego Archaeological Center on the University’s 
behalf.374 The La Posta Band of Mission Indians is a federally-
recognized tribe and one of the twelve associated bands of Kumeyaay 
Indians who are indigenous to the area and claim these remains as their 
common ancestors.375 However, all twelve bands agree that La Posta is 
the appropriate tribal claimant.376 
The University of California transferred the case to federal district 
court because the complaint directly implicated the Native American 
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, and specifically challenged the 
federal regulation on culturally unidentifiable Native American remains 
now codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 10.11.377 Specifically, the claimant 
scientists alleged that the University has a duty “to determine whether or 
not NAGPRA and its accompanying regulations actually apply to the La 
Jolla Skeletons before Respondents dispose of them to the 
Kumeyaay.”378 They further argued that a “disposition without such a 
formal determination would arbitrarily and illegally destroy the La Jolla 
Skeletons’ incalculable scientific value to Petitioners, and to the public 
at large, and would violate NAGPRA.”379 
The California lawsuit reflects a growing sentiment among scientists 
that the federal regulations on culturally unidentifiable Native American 
human remains “allow tribes to claim even those remains whose 
affiliation cannot be established scientifically, as long as they were 
found on or near the tribes’ aboriginal lands,” thus privileging the 
cultural interests of tribes at the expense of scientific knowledge.380 
This position is reflected in a recent editorial in Scientific American, 
which argues that the 2010 regulation privileges “faith over fact” and 
urges the federal government to repeal or revise the regulation.381 In the 
opinion of Scientific American’s Board of Editors, the La Jolla remains 
are unique because of their age and “[t]he excellent preservation of the 
                                                     
granting Kumeyaay Cultural Repatriation Committee’s motion to dismiss and granting Regents of 
the University of California’s motion to dismiss).   
374. Id. at 1. 
375. Id. at 1–2. 
376. Id. at 16. 
377. Id. at 5–6; see also 43 C.F.R. § 10.11 (2012).  
378. Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 13, White v. Univ. of Cal., No. 12625891 (Super. Ct. of 
Cal. Apr. 16, 2012).  
379. Id.  
380. Who Owns the Past?, supra note 8.  
381. Id. 
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specimens,” and they “might contain DNA suitable for analysis” using 
new techniques that could “yield crucial insights into where early 
Americans came from.”382 In a statement that evokes the same 
nineteenth century trope of “discovery” that justified European 
colonization of “the New World,” the editors conclude that: 
The colonization of the New World was a watershed in the 
odyssey that carried Homo sapiens from its African birthplace to 
the entire globe. The stories of the trailblazers who 
accomplished that feat deserve to be told. Their remains are the 
shared patrimony of all Americans and, indeed, all peoples 
everywhere.383 
Dr. Duane Champagne, a leading sociologist at the University of 
California and member of the Turtle Mountain Chippewa Tribe, 
criticized the Scientific American editorial, claiming that it: 
[S]hows little understanding of the forms and strength of 
indigenous relations to ancestors and to the requirements of 
maintaining the spiritual stewardship of the land. From all 
appearances, Scientific American isn’t making much effort to 
understand indigenous cultures’ interpretations of reality, 
meaning, and life. Instead the publication gives credence to 
scientific, professional, and nonspiritual understandings of the 
value and meaning of human ancestors and sacred funerary 
objects. As far as the editors are concerned, American Indian 
perspectives are irrelevant. They’re even irresponsible because 
they don’t protect human history and knowledge.384 
Dr. Champagne further notes that at the heart of the dispute is the 
Kumeyaay Tribes’ claim that they have lived in this area for over 12,000 
years according to their own stories and understandings.385 The scientists 
claim that this is pure “folklore” and that no physical evidence exists that 
the modern Kumeyaay Tribe is culturally affiliated to these ancient 
remains or that they have been in the area more than “a few thousand 
years.”386 
Champagne argues for a “more multicultural, government-to-
government” approach to repatriation that incorporates “both scientific 
                                                     
382. Id. 
383. Id. 
384. Duane Champagne, A New Attack on Repatriation, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA 
NETWORK (Apr. 9, 2012), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2012/04/09/a-new-attack-
on-repatriation-107181. 
385. Id. 
386. Id.  
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and indigenous values.”387 He also argues that collaboration between 
scientists and Indigenous peoples would result in much greater benefit 
than the current approach, which balances the “interests” of science 
against those of Native peoples.388 Under this balancing approach, the 
“public interest” in obtaining the maximum amount of knowledge will 
nearly always outweigh the cultural interests of a small group of Native 
Americans. 
The California case, like the Bonnichsen and Havasupai cases, 
exemplifies the continuing occurrence of epistemic injustice for Native 
peoples. In all three cases, the scientists argue that the larger social 
interest in human origins research ought to outweigh any asserted 
“cultural” harm expressed by indigenous groups. This argument 
effectively reduces the indigenous peoples to the status of religious 
zealots, who are free to “believe” anything that they desire pursuant to 
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, so long as they do not 
make demands that would contravene an important public interest. 
Building on Dr. Champagne’s call for a new approach that better 
respects the unique interests and rights of Native peoples, the final 
section of this Article argues that contemporary human rights constructs 
can offer a more principled basis for adjudicating the disputes that 
continue to evoke “epistemic injustice” for indigenous peoples. 
IV.  SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
As demonstrated above, American science has had a profound impact 
on the legal and political rights of indigenous peoples on this continent, 
and it continues to have this effect. Presumably, however, most scientists 
would agree that the ideal future is one that respects the basic human 
rights of all peoples, including indigenous peoples. Science is a valuable 
tool in crafting social policy, and it can be used to further Native self-
determination or, alternately, to reinforce the unjust structures that have 
operated to suppress indigenous self-determination. This section of the 
Article will discuss U.S. policy in light of international human rights 
norms in order to demonstrate those two different uses and encourage 
more conscious choices in the future. 
The Article first discusses the basic argument for applying 
international human rights norms to the domestic legislative, 
administrative, and judicial structures that determine Native rights. The 
Article then indicates how application of human rights norms could alter 
                                                     
387. Id. 
388. Id. 
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public policy in the areas of environmental, health, and repatriation 
policy, and could potentially promote a new model for science policy 
that is more inclusive of indigenous peoples’ distinctive interests and 
rights. 
A.  The Argument for Integrating International Human Rights Norms 
into Domestic Law 
Under principles of U.S. federal Indian law, Native peoples are 
recognized as separate sovereign governments, and they have the same 
capacity and need as other governments to build their economic base, 
protect the health of tribal members, and regulate their lands and 
resources for the benefit of future generations.389 As separate 
governments, federally-recognized tribes in the United States have 
certain legal and political rights that are unique and vital to their ability 
to govern their lands and members. For example, tribal governments 
have the right to lease their lands for mineral exploitation or other 
energy development,390 to regulate air and water quality,391 and to 
participate in regional adaptation plans designed to manage land and 
water resources that transcend the jurisdictional boundaries of local or 
state governments.392 They may also regulate the conduct of non-Indians 
who enter their lands to engage in activities, including research, that 
have the potential to impact the tribe or its members.393 
In their capacity as sovereigns, tribal governments have the capacity 
to enter partnerships with scientists for mutual benefit.394 Furthermore, 
these agreements can, for the most part, be regulated by principles of 
contract, tort, and property law, subject to the jurisdictional rules of 
federal Indian law.395 However, as the Havasupai case demonstrates, the 
                                                     
389. See generally GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 20. 
390. COHEN, supra note 230, § 17.01, at 1074–75. 
391. Id., §§ 10.01–.03, at 774–95.  
392. Id.  
393. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (“A tribe may regulate, through 
taxation, licensing, or other means, activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships 
with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other 
arrangements.”).  
394. For example, the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community has entered a partnership 
agreement with T-Gen Corporation. See Collaborations with Genetics Researchers, AM. INDIAN & 
ALASKA NATIVE GENETICS RESOURCE CENTER, http://genetics.ncai.org/case-
study/collaborations.cfm (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).  
395. See, e.g., Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 (confirming tribal power to regulate the activities of 
nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, for example, through 
a contract or lease agreement). 
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capacity of tribal governments to enter consensual agreements with 
researchers cannot solve the structural forms of epistemic injustice that 
exist within our national policies. In this area, indigenous peoples’ 
human rights under international law become quite important. In 
addition, human rights principles are vital to understanding indigenous 
rights in cases where tribal governments no longer possess jurisdiction 
over lands or other resources based on prevailing notions of property 
law. 
The domestic framework of federal Indian law actually supports 
incorporation of human rights norms. The status of Native Nations as 
separate peoples predates the political existence of the United States, and 
a host of Supreme Court cases from the nineteenth century until the 
present day have recognized this.396 The status of being a separate 
people has both a political and a cultural component. The political 
component is now understood to comprise the jurisdictional authority of 
tribes as sovereign governments.397 However, Native peoples also 
continue to exist as distinctive cultural groups within a dominant society 
committed to “multiculturalism” and pluralism in a secular democracy. 
As distinctive cultural groups, Native peoples often have divergent 
interests from the dominant society which may find expression in their 
need to protect sacred sites on lands no longer within their jurisdiction, 
speak their languages, preserve their access to traditional food sources 
and medicines, repatriate sacred objects, and prevent the 
misappropriation of their ceremonies, songs, and other resources.398 All 
of these interests are vital to the preservation of Native American 
cultural integrity and are therefore pivotal to tribal self-determination.399 
Consequently, Native American human rights should be factored into 
U.S. public policy. 
Of course, it is possible that the primary obstacle to reforming 
domestic law to accord with human rights norms is America’s collective 
blindspot when it comes to questions of “injustice.” American courts 
generally fail to see the limitations of domestic law as a form of 
                                                     
396. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 
10 (1831). 
397. See Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking The Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine: 
Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 191 
(2001).  
398. See generally COHEN, supra note 230. 
399. See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 131–41 (2d ed. 2004) 
(explaining that cultural integrity is a key norm encompassed within the concept of self-
determination).  
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“injustice,” claiming instead that the Native claimants in Bonnichsen 
failed to “meet their burden of proof” to show cultural affiliation, or 
claiming that American property law simply cannot encompass a notion 
of “group” ownership of tribal genetic material.400 Similarly, the courts 
find that American tort law simply cannot extend to cover the cultural 
harm that inappropriate use of a blood or tissue samples causes, or that 
privacy law cannot extend to the public disclosure of photos of ancestral 
remains.401 How do we navigate these controversies? More specifically, 
how do we even approach the resolution of these debates, as a matter of 
law or of ethics? International human rights law provides some insights 
into these difficult questions. 
B.  International Human Rights Law as a Tool of Public Policy 
International human rights law provides a relevant set of norms to 
address shortcomings in domestic legal frameworks. Of course, this can 
only occur if our domestic courts and legislatures are willing to apply 
those norms. Some state legislatures have attempted to ban the use of 
international doctrines by their judicial systems.402 Even without such 
drastic action, however, domestic courts have generally declined to 
apply human rights norms, instead holding to the view that rights, if any, 
must be embedded in domestic constitutional law, common law, or 
statutory law.403 This is not true in many other countries, such as Canada 
and Australia, where the domestic courts have readily applied human 
rights norms to extend or recognize specific rights.404 
While American courts tend to assume that the dominant society’s 
appraisal of legal rights is the only relevant social experience, 
international human rights law is in the process of documenting another 
category of social experience: that of indigenous peoples throughout the 
                                                     
400. Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 881–82 (9th Cir. 2004). 
401. See Tsosie, supra note 1, at 405–07.   
402. On November 2, 2010, Oklahoma voters approved a proposed constitutional amendment that 
would prevent Oklahoma state courts from considering or using Sharia law. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 
F.3d 1111, 1116 (10th Cir. 2012). After a federal district court granted a preliminary injunction to 
prevent the Oklahoma State Election Board from certifying this election result, and thereby making 
the amendment effective, the Board sought review, but the Tenth Circuit found no abuse of 
discretion by the lower court and affirmed the preliminary injunction. Id. at 1116–17.  
403. See, e.g., Crow v. Gullet, 541 F.Supp. 785, 794 (D.S.D.1982) (failing to find any authority 
for the proposition that a right or cause of action is created by international human rights law).   
404. See, e.g., Mabo v. Queensland (No.2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 5 (Austl.). In this case, the High 
Court of Australia held for the first time that the indigenous peoples of Australia possessed 
aboriginal land rights and that the earlier nineteenth century doctrines that failed to recognize these 
rights violated human rights law.  
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world. This work, which has been ongoing for several decades, validates 
the fact that indigenous peoples throughout the world share a common 
set of cultural and political attributes in relation to the dominant societies 
that now encompass them. 
Ideally, nation-states will consult this record of human rights law as 
they work to retool their domestic legal systems to minimize structural 
injustice. That is the message of James Anaya, the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, who recently held a 
series of consultations with tribal leaders and advocates in the United 
States to document instances of injustice and prepare a “country report” 
for the United States indicating whether the country is in compliance 
with human rights norms and where the country should focus its efforts 
to remediate existing injustice.405 This consultation follows from the 
historic consensus of global nation-states that emerged in the context of 
developing the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.406 
In 2007, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which recognizes that indigenous peoples 
possess the right to self-determination as a matter of international 
policy.407 The right to self-determination secures the basic right of 
indigenous peoples to autonomous self-governance within the nation-
states that now encompass them.408 The Declaration envisions that the 
indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination will be exercised within 
the nation-state’s basic structure, and the document advocates 
consultation between indigenous peoples and the nation-states on 
policies that will impact them.409 Specifically, the Declaration requires 
states to “consult and cooperate in good faith with the Indigenous 
peoples concerned” and “to obtain their free, prior and informed 
consent” before undertaking administrative or legislative actions that 
will affect them.410 
The Declaration’s many provisions attest to the unique interests of 
indigenous peoples, which are often cultural, spiritual, and religious in 
                                                     
405. S. James Anaya is also a Professor of Law at the University of Arizona and widely 
acclaimed scholar of international human rights law and indigenous rights. See, e.g., ANAYA, supra 
note 399.   
406. S. James Anaya, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/34 (July 15, 2009).  
407. Declaration, supra note 3. 
408. See id. arts. 3–4. 
409. See id. arts. 3–4, 19; Rebecca Tsosie, Reconceptualizing Tribal Rights: Can Self-
Determination Be Actualized Within the U.S. Constitutional Structure?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
923, 930–35 (2011).  
410. Declaration, supra note 3, art. 19. 
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nature.411 It is precisely because of these unique interests that indigenous 
peoples merit special consideration within domestic policymaking. As 
demonstrated above, domestic policymaking is dependent upon a model 
of secular pluralism. Secular pluralism privileges science, economics, 
and technology as appropriate constructs for domestic public policy, 
whereas “cultural” concerns are generally conflated with “religion” and 
marginalized as matters of private conscience rather than public policy. 
Human rights norms offer a more inclusive account of the multiple and 
diverse interests that ought to be considered by policymakers in the 
furtherance of indigenous self-determination. 
It is significant that the United Nations General Assembly adopted the 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples after over twenty-five 
years of negotiations, hearings, and intensive dialogues between 
representatives of the nation-states and indigenous peoples.412 The 
consultative process that led to the adoption of the U.N. Declaration 
represented an effort to include indigenous peoples in the formation of 
the norms that will govern them. Although the Declaration is purely 
prescriptive at this point, it may eventually result in the adoption of an 
international convention.413 Even without this action, however, the 
Declaration has served a useful purpose, promoting a dialogue about 
indigenous rights within the United States and many other global 
nations.414 
The United States, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada originally 
dissented from adopting the Declaration because the document 
recognized indigenous peoples as “peoples” with the same right to self-
determination as other peoples.415 The United States and other countries 
feared that this would foster claims by indigenous peoples to secede 
from the nation-states.416 Importantly, however, the Declaration 
expressly provides that nothing in its text justifies the impairment of 
national boundaries,417 thereby indicating that the remedy of secession is 
not available under international law for indigenous peoples, although it 
                                                     
411. Tsosie, supra note 409, at 927. 
412. E.S.C. Res. 1982/34, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1982/82 (May 7, 1982).  
413. Tsosie, supra note 409, at 925. 
414. Id. at 928. 
415. U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th plen. mtg. at 18–19, U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.107 (Sept. 13, 
2007). 
416. Christopher J. Fromherz, Indigenous Peoples’ Courts: Egalitarian Juridical Pluralism, Self-
Determination, and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 156 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1341, 1346 (2008). 
417. Declaration, supra note 3, art. 46.  
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might be available for other peoples when the right to self-determination 
is suppressed under conditions of extreme injustice. President Barack 
Obama formally announced his support for the Declaration in 2010, and 
the U.S. State Department subsequently issued a position paper alleging 
that the rights of federally-recognized tribes under federal Indian law 
reflect the premise of the Declaration by favoring a policy of self-
determination.418 
It is clear that indigenous self-determination is the key norm to be 
effectuated within U.S. policy. The norm of indigenous self-
determination, in turn, prescribes recognition of indigenous rights of 
autonomy, cultural integrity, and protection of lands and resources. The 
Declaration envisions a relationship between indigenous peoples and 
nation-states that operates as a consensual partnership. Thus, indigenous 
peoples must agree to the terms of their relationship with the nation-
states.419 Their right to autonomy may be secured through a self-
governance model, such as that which applies to federally-recognized 
tribal governments in the U.S. With respect to shared resources, Native 
autonomy may also express through models of shared governance, such 
as self-administration of federal programs and co-management of shared 
resources. Finally, Native autonomy is served by a model of 
participatory governance, which supports the efforts of tribal 
governments to ensure that their members enjoy equal access to 
important civil liberties, such as voting rights.420 
The Declaration calls for a standard of “free, prior and informed 
consent” before national governments take actions that would impair 
Native rights.421 This standard is intended to ensure that the negotiations 
between indigenous peoples and national governments are premised on a 
foundation of respect, rather than coercion.422 In addition, the 
Declaration alludes to important concepts, such as spiritual rights, that 
are unique to indigenous peoples and should inform the policy dialogue 
                                                     
418. See President Barack Obama, Remarks at the White House Tribal Nations Conference (Dec. 
16, 2010), in 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1076, at 1–5; Announcement of U.S. Support for the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE 1–2 (Jan. 12, 
2011), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/154782.pdf [hereinafter Announcement of U.S. 
Support].  
419. Announcement of U.S. Support, supra note 418. 
420. See Tsosie, supra note 409, at 933. 
421. Declaration, supra note 3, art. 19. 
422. See id. (“States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples 
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and 
informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may 
affect them.”).  
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about their rights to land, natural resources, and cultural resources.423 
Finally, the document maintains a commitment to reparative justice, 
directing national governments to acknowledge the historical wrongs 
that continue to disadvantage indigenous peoples from the enjoyment of 
their human and civil rights, and requiring the governments to remediate 
those inequities.424 In all of these respects, international human rights 
law offers an alternative set of norms that can address the epistemic 
forms of injustice that indigenous peoples continue to suffer in this 
country. 
C.  Human Rights Law and the Public Policy Arena: Envisioning a 
Different Future 
The discussion of injustice and human rights can seem theoretical and 
abstract, so it is useful to examine specific human rights norms that 
might inform U.S. public policy in the areas of the U.S. national 
environmental, health, and repatriation policies. 
1.  National Environmental Policy and Indigenous Rights 
The Declaration offers a great deal of guidance for domestic 
policymakers with respect to environmental and land management 
issues. Most importantly, the Declaration specifically recognizes that the 
essence of indigenous identity is represented in the group’s longstanding 
connection to a particular land base and territory.425 Thus, harms to the 
land can also constitute harms to indigenous identity. In addition, the 
document recognizes that the relationship of the indigenous people to 
their traditional lands is often a core feature of their cultural survival and 
that the land may be fundamentally important to the continuance of 
specific cultural and religious practices.426 Consequently, under the 
declaration, the U.S. government would not only have to ensure the 
                                                     
423. “Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual 
relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters 
and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities to future generations in this 
regard.” Id. art. 25. 
424. See id. Preamble (expressing concern over historic injustices that have been suffered by 
indigenous peoples and calling upon nation-states to acknowledge their inherent rights and respect 
their rights under treaties and political accords). 
425. Id. (“Convinced that control by indigenous peoples over development affecting them and 
their lands, territories and resources will enable them to maintain and strengthen their institutions, 
cultures and traditions, and to promote their development in accordance with their aspirations and 
needs.”). 
426. Id. 
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tribal government’s ability to regulate its reservation land base to 
promote the health and cultural needs of its members, but it would also 
have to ensure that its decisionmaking on public lands does not 
jeopardize Native American cultural practices, for example, those 
associated with sacred sites, such as the San Francisco Peaks. 
The Declaration contains many provisions relevant to indigenous land 
rights, but four seem particularly relevant to the discussion above. First, 
the Declaration provides that “indigenous peoples have the right to 
maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship” with their 
traditionally owned lands and waters and to “uphold their 
responsibilities to future generations in this regard.”427 The document’s 
recognition of “spiritual rights” specifically incorporates indigenous 
understandings of the universe and the metaphysics that governs human 
interactions with the natural world.428 Second, the Declaration 
emphasizes that indigenous peoples’ rights to their lands and territories 
merit legal protection by the domestic government.429 This suggests that 
the pervasive tendency of the United States to generate prescriptive 
statements of law that are non-enforceable, such as the American Indian 
Religious Freedom Act, would not constitute effective legal protection 
of indigenous rights under the Declaration. Third, Article 27 of the 
Declaration requires states to establish and implement fair and 
transparent processes to adjudicate indigenous land rights.430 Finally, 
Article 28 provides that indigenous peoples should have the right to 
“redress” for takings of their lands and resources that take place without 
their “free, prior and informed consent.”431 
Land use management is intimately tied to environmental and energy 
policy, so the rights described above form the basis for many other 
specific rights recognized by the Declaration. For example, Article 29 
specifies that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to the conservation 
and protection of the environment,” as well as the right to enjoy the 
“productive capacity of their lands or territories and resources.”432 States 
are counseled to take appropriate measures to guard against 
environmental degradation that might be caused, for example, by storing 
or disposing of hazardous materials on indigenous lands “without their 
                                                     
427. Id. art. 25.  
428. See id. 
429. Id. art. 26.  
430. Id. art. 27. 
431. Id. art. 28. 
432. Id. art. 29. 
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free, prior and informed consent.”433 In the U.S. this provision would 
apply to any national policies that promoted forms of economic 
development that are hazardous to the environment and to human health, 
such as uranium mining on the reservation or storage of nuclear waste or 
hazardous waste on tribal lands. 
Article 20 of the Declaration provides that “[i]ndigenous peoples have 
the right to maintain and develop their political, economic and social 
systems or institutions,” and that they should be “secure in the 
enjoyment” of their own traditional economies.434 This provision 
specifically recognizes that indigenous peoples are likely to have land-
based subsistence economies that are vulnerable to destruction by 
national government policies, such as off-shore oil drilling. Article 20 
specifically provides that “[i]ndigenous peoples deprived of their means 
of subsistence and development are entitled to just and fair redress.”435 
In the years ahead, this provision is likely to receive significant 
attention, given the politics of energy development. Off-shore oil drilling 
is often understood as a means to ensure American energy 
“independence.” The costs of this development, of course, are localized 
on indigenous communities that practice subsistence ways of life. 
2.  National Health Policy and Indigenous Rights 
With respect to health policy, the Declaration provides at a general 
level that “Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a 
collective or as individuals” of all human rights guaranteed under 
international law.436 Thus, to the extent that there is a recognized human 
right to health, indigenous peoples are entitled to enjoy that right, in 
common with all other citizens. They also have the right to be free from 
discrimination in the exercise of that right.437 Article 24 specifically 
provides that “Indigenous peoples have the right to their traditional 
medicines and to maintain their health practices,” as well as “the right to 
                                                     
433. Id. 
434. Id. art. 20. 
435. Id. 
436. Id. art. 1. 
437. Although there are international documents recognizing a human right to health, the United 
States continues to deny that the government has any obligation to ensure realization of this right. 
Thus, national health care is primarily conceived of as an economic system to improve the delivery 
of health care and protect consumers against wrongful conduct by insurance companies or 
employers. See also id. art. 2 (providing that indigenous peoples and individuals are “free and equal 
to all other peoples and individuals” for purposes of exercising their rights and being free from 
discrimination in the exercise of those rights).  
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access, without any discrimination, all social and health services.”438 In 
addition, “[i]ndigenous individuals have an equal right to the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health,” and 
states are required to take the steps necessary to ensure “full realization 
of this right.”439 This provision would counsel the United States to 
engage in a consultative process with tribal communities about how to 
address health disparities and reconfigure existing programs more fairly. 
This would also enable Native peoples within the Indian Health Care 
Service system to take advantage of the advances in health care 
technology that are available to more affluent American citizens. 
Currently, federal funding constraints applicable to the Indian Health 
Service tend to limit the availability of costly forms of diagnosis and 
treatment for many serious diseases, such as cancer. Moreover, 
individuals who become sick during the latter part of the fiscal year may 
be denied services altogether because the available funds have already 
been exhausted. 
The Declaration discusses genetic resources as a category of cultural 
heritage, providing that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to maintain, 
control, protect and develop their cultural heritage,” and the 
“manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including 
human and genetic resources.”440 States “shall take effective measures to 
recognize and protect the exercise of these rights.”441 These provisions 
would counsel the United States to adopt effective protections to ensure 
that tribal genetic resources are not lumped into the “genome commons” 
that will provide the raw material for future scientific innovations in 
health care, such as personalized medicine. Existing research standards, 
for example, those applicable to Genome Wide Association Studies, 
draw on multiple sources and permit inclusion of all samples that are 
“deidentified” from the actual donor in order to meet privacy 
concerns.442 This restriction is not sufficient to address the tribal interests 
identified in the Havasupai litigation and analogous international 
cases.443 
                                                     
438. Id. art. 24. 
439. Id. 
440. Id. art. 31. 
441. Id. 
442. See, e.g., Genome-Wide Association Studies, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS, 
http://gwas.nih.gov (last visited Nov. 18, 2012). 
443. See Donald J. Willison, Trends in Collection, Use and Disclosure of Personal Information in 
Contemporary Health Research: Challenges for Research Governance, 13 HEALTH L. REV. 107, 
110 (2005) (detailing the misuse of blood samples taken from members of the Nuu-Chah-Nulth 
First Nation of British Columbia, Canada).   
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3.  Indigenous Peoples and U.S. Repatriation Policy 
The Declaration discusses the right of indigenous peoples to repatriate 
their ancestral human remains in Articles 11 and 12. Article 11 
recognizes that indigenous peoples have a “right to maintain, protect and 
develop the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures,” 
including “archaeological and historical sites.”444 States must provide 
effective redress, including restitution, for any “cultural, intellectual, 
religious and spiritual property” taken from indigenous peoples “without 
their free, prior and informed consent or in violation of their laws, 
traditions and customs.”445 This provision would suggest that the effort 
of archaeologists to claim ownership of Native American burials, 
including ancestral remains and funerary objects, is completely 
antithetical to indigenous peoples’ human rights. In fact, the 2010 
regulation on disposition of culturally unidentifiable human remains that 
scientists attack as “too favorable” to Native cultural interests, does not 
provide for the mandatory return of funerary objects associated with the 
human remains.446 Whether or not this omission violates NAGPRA, it 
clearly constitutes a violation of international human rights law. 
Article 12 specifically provides that indigenous peoples have “the 
right to the repatriation of their human remains” and requires States to 
enable access to and repatriation of any ancestral human remains and 
ceremonial objects within their possession “through fair, transparent and 
effective mechanisms developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples 
concerned.”447 The upshot of these provisions is to place the ownership 
and control of indigenous human remains, funerary objects, and 
ceremonial objects with Indigenous peoples. There is nothing within 
international human rights law that supports the notion currently alleged 
by many scientists that indigenous human remains are the “shared 
patrimony of all Americans” or of “all peoples elsewhere.”448 The 
United States has an obligation to ensure that indigenous peoples’ 
human rights are realized within its domestic legal system, and the 
Declaration provides an appropriate normative basis to achieve its vision 
of a consultative process of policymaking. 
Human rights standards and principles can serve an important 
function in reformulating public policy. To the extent that public policy 
                                                     
444. Declaration, supra note 3, art. 11. 
445. Id. 
446. 43 C.F.R. § 10.11 (2012).  
447. Declaration, supra note 3, art. 12. 
448. Who Owns the Past?, supra note 8. 
07 - Tsosie Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2012  7:38 PM 
2012] INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE 1201 
 
incorporates science policy, human rights standards can contribute to 
developing an equitable legal framework that can represent the 
experience of indigenous peoples in defining the benefits and harms of 
our public policies. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has explored how science policy impacts indigenous 
peoples, and it has advocated a shift from treating indigenous peoples as 
objects of “scientific discovery” to working respectfully with indigenous 
governments as equal participants in the creation of public policy. While 
many people acknowledge the overt racism and cultural superiority of 
nineteenth century science policy, few understand that those nineteenth 
century themes continue to impact indigenous rights within the United 
States in areas such as environmental policy, health policy, and 
repatriation policy. These areas of public policy have had tremendous 
impact on Native peoples in the United States, demonstrating the 
pervasive “epistemic injustice” caused by the uncritical application of 
Western values, categories, and standards to the very different social 
experience of Native peoples. 
American society has harmed indigenous peoples within domestic 
social, political, and legal structures both in their capacity as “givers of 
knowledge” and in their capacity as “subjects of social understanding.” 
By incorporating human rights standards and honoring indigenous self-
determination as both a legal right and a moral consideration, domestic 
public policy can more equitably respond to indigenous peoples’ 
distinctive experience. Similarly, scientists and scientific organizations 
can incorporate human rights standards into their disciplinary methods 
and professional codes of ethics in order to explore the ethical and legal 
implications of their work on indigenous peoples. 
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
calls for nation-states to engage indigenous peoples in a set of processes 
designed to effectuate a more just framework for the realization of basic 
rights and fundamental freedoms. This international human rights 
framework supports the ability of indigenous peoples to claim their 
sovereign right to live according to their own norms and values within 
the nation-states that now encompass them, and to fully participate 
within the domestic structures that determine whether “justice” will truly 
be for all. 
 
